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INTRODUCTION

It is a well-established general rule and practice in international
law that a non-recognized State or Government has no access, as a
plaintiff, to the courts of a non-recognizing State., The question of
non-accessibility was raised again in a recent and still pending Japanese
case which is now before the Japanese Supreme Court. In the In re
Guanghua Liao case (generally referred to in the Japanese media as
the Koka Dormitory case or the Kokario case), lower Japanese courts
allowed a lawsuit, brought by the local authorities in Taiwan under
the name of the so-called Republic of China, which is not recognized
by the Japanese Government as such, to proceed against Chinese

1. See, e.g., J.
1984).

STARK,

INTRODUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 142 (London 8th ed.
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state-owned real estate located in Kyoto. 2 The former government of
China purchased the five-story Guanghua Liao dormitory with money
that belonged to the Chinese people after the Second World War in
Kyoto. The building has since become China's State property and is
used as a dormitory for students from China studying in Japan. The
Kuomintang regime in Taiwan had the building registered in Kyoto
as China's State property in the name of "the Republic of China" in
1961.3 In 1967, the local Taiwanese authorities filed a lawsuit in the
Kyoto District Court claiming ownership to the Guanghua Liao building. The claim was not heard until 1977 when the Court rejected the
plaintiff's contention that the building belonged to the People's Republic of China. 4 The Court based its judgment on the ground that since
the Japanese Government had recognized the Government of the
People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate Government of China
in 1972, any of China's State property in Japan which belonged to the
former Chinese Government was transferred to the People's Republic
of China. s However, the Osaka High Court accepted an appeal brought
by the plaintiff on behalf of the so-called "Republic of China," and in
1982, the Osaka Court overturned the Kyoto District Court's original
judgment of 1977.6 On February 26, 1987, the Osaka High Court ruled
7
that the Guanghua Liao building belonged to "the Republic of China."

2. The entire case in question is not officially reported yet. There have been numerous
news reports on the case in the Chinese media, see, e.g., Renmin Ribao (Haiwai Ban), People's
Daily, Feb. 10, 1987, at 1; Feb. 16, 1987, at 6; Mar. 1, 1987, at 4; Mar. 25, 1987, at 6; June 4,
1987, at 1 & 4; June 16, 1987, at 1; July 11, 1987, at 2 (Overseas Ed.) [hereinafter People's
Daily]; Beij. Rev., Mar. 9, 1987, at 8; May 18, 1987, at 6; June 1, 1987, at 10. See also infra
notes 14-23 and accompanying texts.
For articles bearing on this subject, see generally Haopei, infra note 3; Lihai, infra note
35; Shen, Taiwan Dangju Wuquan Chusu yu Riben Fayuan (The Taiwanese Authorities Have
No Standing in the Courts of Japan - The In re Guanghua Liao Case), 27 GuoJI WENTI
YANJIU (J. INT'L STUD.), at 4-19 (1987); Zhu, infra note 12.
3. See Haopei, Lun Riben Fayuan du Guanghua Liao an Panjue De Feifaxing (On the
Unlawfulness of the Japanese Courts' Decision in the In re Guanghua Liao Case), People's

Daily, Jan. 23, 1987, at 2; see also 22

JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

151, 153

(1978) [hereinafter J.A.I.L.].
4. See Haopei, supra note 3.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Xinhua News Agency, Daban Gaodeng FayuanCuowu Panjue Guanghua Liao an Wenti
(The Osaka High Court Erroneously Decided the Guanghua Liao Case), People's Daily, Feb.
27, 1987, at 1; see also Qiwu, Jiu Guanghua Liao Wenti Da Benbao Jizhe Wen (Responses to
Questions by Journalists of the People's Daily on the Guanghua Liao Case), People's Daily,
Mar. 16, 1987, at 2; Staff Report, Japan's Court Ruling Creates "Two Chains," Beij. Rev.,
Mar. 9, 1987, at 8.
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Leaving other legal issues aside,8 scholars are faced with a primary
question: while the Japanese government recognized the Government
of the People's Republic of China as the only lawful Government of
China and Taiwan as an inseparable part of the Chinese territory,
may Japanese courts accept and adjudicate suits and appeals brought
by the local Taiwanese authorities in the name of "the Republic of
China?" According to the established rule and practice mentioned
above, the answer is definitely not. To better answer this question, it
is necessary to examine the legal foundation of the relations between
the two countries, to give an extensive presentation of the current
case, and to make appropriate references to the general theory and
practice on point in the international arena.
II.

THE LEGAL, BASIS OF THE SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

On September 29, 1972, the Premier of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai (Chou-en-Lai), the Minister of
Foreign Affairs Ji Pengfei (Chi Peng-Fei), and Prime Minister of Japan
Kakuei Tanaka, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Ohira
signed the profound and historically significant Joint Communiqu6 between the Governments of the People's Republic of China and Japan
[hereinafter cited as the Joint Communique], declaring the normalization of the two countries' mutual relations. Under that Joint Communiqu6, "the Government of Japan recognized the Government of
the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate Government of
China." The Japanese government "fully understands and respects"
the stand held by the Government of the People's Republic of China
that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's
Republic of China, and will firmly adhere to the principle stated in

8. The major legal issues involved in the case are, among others: First, is the Guanghua
Liao Dormitory concerned transferrable to the People's Republic of China after it was recognized
by the Japanese Government as the sole legitimate Government of China of which Taiwan is
an inalienable territorial part? Second, is the succession of the Government of the People's
Republic of China to the former Government of the Republic of China a partial (or incomplete)
one? Third, is the case in question merely an ordinary one of civil lawsuit? Fourth, can the
Japanese Government claim exemption from responsibility by invoking the principle of separation
of powers - division of powers among three governmental branches?, etc.
For brief discussions of these issues, see infra notes 193- 226 and accompanying texts. For
more extensive treatment, see Haopei, supra note 3; Lihai, infra note 35; Qiwu, supra note 7;
Hua, Riben Fayuan Jiang Guanghua Liao Pangei Taiwan Dangju Yangju Weifan Zhong-Ri
Lianhe Shengming (JapaneseCourts Seriously Violated the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqug
by Ruling that the Guanghua Liao Belonged to the Taiwan Authorities), People's Daily, July
18, 1987, at 2; Zhou, Guanghua Lao Caichan Xingzhi De Queding Wenti (The Issue on the
Determinationof the Nature of the GuanghuaLiao Property), People's Daily, July 25, 1987, at 2.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol5/iss3/5

4

Shen: Revisiting the
Disability of theSTATES
Non-Recognized in the Courts of
NON-RECOGNIZING

paragraph eight of the Potsdam Declaration. 9 Six years later, a Treaty
of Peace and Friendship between the People's Republic of China and
Japan [hereinafter Peace and Friendship Treaty] was concluded in
Beijing on August 12, 1978, reiterating that the principles stipulated
in the Joint Communiqu6 must be strictly observed.10 The Joint Communiqu6 and Peace and Friendship Treaty constitutes the important
legal basis for the present Sino-Japanese relations. A treaty or an
international agreement is by no means merely a scrap of paper,
rather, it has significant legal consequences. Once entered into, such
a treaty or agreement becomes legally binding upon the contracting
parties and must be observed and implemented faithfully and strictly.
The legal consequences of the Joint Communiqu6 and the Peace and
Friendship Treaty, both being treaties in the sense of international
law, include the following: the Japanese government, in its foreign
policy with China, must recognize that there is only one China to
which Taiwan belongs, and the Government of the People's Republic
of China is the sole legitimate government representing the entire
Chinese people in the international arena. This of course implies that
the Government of Japan does not and cannot recognize any so-called
"government," other than the Government of the People's Republic
of China. To Japan, the so-called "Government of the Republic of
China" has neither de jure nor de facto existence. The present local
Taiwanese authorities governing that province are, in legal theory, no
more than one of China's provincial governments. Such a local regime
does not possess the power and right to speak on behalf of the central
Government or for the whole nation in international affairs.
Whenever China establishes diplomatic relations, there has always
been a prerequisite. The other negotiating party, as a precondition,
has to recognize that the Government of the People's Republic of
China is the sole legitimate Government of China, and that Taiwan
is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of
China. 1' This is also the case with the normalization of China-Japan
9. Joint Communiqu6, China-Japan, Sept. 29, 1972, 2-3. For the text of the Joint Communiqu6, see People's Daily, Sept. 30, 1972 (domestic ed.). For an unofficial English translation
of the text, see 17 J.A.I.L. 81 (1973).
Note: On the very same day of the signing of the document, the Government of Japan
declared its decision to sever diplomatic relations with the so-called Government of the Republic
of China and to terminate the Japan-Republic of China Peace Treaty done in 1952. See 17
J.A.I.L. 62-63 & 223 (1973).
10. Peace and Friendship Treaty between China-Japan of Aug. 12, 1978, People's Daily,
Aug. 13, 1978 (domestic ed.) (Preamble), 23 J.A.I.L. 226 (1979). For an unofficial English
translation of the text, see 17 I.L.M. 1054 (1978).
11. As with the case of, e.g., Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Lebanon, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Peru, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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relations. There has never been any exception on this point. Otherwise,
it would have been impossible for more than 130 countries to have
reached agreements with China on establishing mutual diplomatic relations. In other words, any foreign Government wishing to establish
or maintain official diplomatic relations with the Chinese Government
necessarily touches upon both aspects of the problem of recognition:
1) on the one hand, recognizing the Government of the People's Republic of China, as the only legal Government of this particular subject
of international law known as the State of China, and 2) on the other
hand, refusing to recognize the so-called "Republic of China," or withdrawing recognition where the foreign Government formerly maintained "diplomatic relations" with the local regime in Taiwan.
Since 1972, the Government of Japan has not recognized and does
not maintain official relations with the local authorities in Taiwan who
claim themselves to be the so-called "Government of the Republic of
China." The government of Japan is barred from doing so by virtue
of its very recognition of the Government of the People's Republic of
China as the sole Government of China to which Taiwan belongs. As
a matter of fact, the Governments of China and Japan have agreed
upon certain principles regarding the Taiwan issues. Accordingly,
Japan may maintain no more than unofficial, non-governmental or
inter-regional economic and commercial intercourses, and any official
relations must be avoided. 12 This is also true of the basic factual situations concerning Sino-Japanese relations since the signing of the Joint
Communiqu6. When signing an agreement on air transportation with
the Chinese Government, for example, the Japanese counterpart made
it clear that "the agreement between Japan and the People's Republic
of China is one between States," while the civil aviation contact between Japan and Taiwan is non-governmental and regional. 13 This
further explains Japan's undertaking on Sino-Japanese relations, especially on the Taiwan issues. As long as this undertaking does not
change, and as long as the Joint Communiqu6 and the Peace and
Friendship Treaty between China and Japan continue to be effective,
the basic principles contained in those documents must be faithfully
observed and no deviation from them should be allowed under any
circumstances.

12. See Zhu, Guanghua Liao an Zhong De Chengren Wenti (The Issue of Recognition in
the Guanghua Liao Case), People's Daily, Mar. 23, 1987, at 2.
13. Qiwu, supra note 7.
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III.

407

In re Guanghua Liao

CASE: ILLEGAL ACTION AND
ILLEGAL ACCEPTANCE

A.

The Origin of the Case

The Guanghua Liao (Kokario in the Japanese pronunciation) building in question is a five-story dormitory located in Kyoto, Japan. It
was built in 1931 and was owned by the Goshikaisha Rakuto Apartment
Company. During the Second World War, Kyoto University, authorized by the "Ministry of Greater Far East" of Japan and aiming
to offer "concentrated" education to groups of students from what was
known then as the Republic of China, leased the building from
Goshikaisha Rakuto Apartment, and provided it as a residence for
about one hundred students from China. The "Ministry of Greater
Far East" was dissolved and consequently the education program was
abolished when the Japanese army surrendered in 1945. Kyoto University was unable to pay the rent, and the students from China were
not able to pay or to find other places in which to reside. As a result,
the Chinese students continued to reside in and manage the building,
calling it "Guanghua Liao" (Koka Dorm or Kokario in Japanese).14
Shorjiro Fujii, the owner of the building and the representative
member of the Goshikaisha Rakuto Apartment which owned the land,
was unable to collect the rent or use the building. As a result, he
negotiated with the Tax Administration Agency and other agencies
concerned to sell the land and the building thereon. He failed to come
to an agreement because the building was possessed by students from
15
China for their residence.
The Chinese students residing in the Guanghua Liao building and
in other places organized an alumni association to help each other
manage their lives. In 1947, a large quantity of spoils, such as wool
and tung oil, were stolen and robbed from China by the Japanese
army during the Second World War. The spoils were taken over by
the Take-Over Committee for War Reparations and Goods Return, a
subsidiary organ under the Resident Representation of the Chinese
Government, and were sold on the spot upon approval by the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers. The representatives of the Chinese
residents in the building appealed to the General Headquarters of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to give them the proceeds
from the sale of the spoils as relief money for their clothing, food,
and residence.

14. Id. See also 22 J.A.I.L. 151, 154 (1978). Guanghua (Koka) literally means (1) brilliant
or (2) to bring honor to China; Liao (rio) means dormitory or building.
15. 22 J.A.I.L. at 154.
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It was decided to allot the money from the sale of the spoils to
the students from China as relief money. The Resident Representative
of the then Republic of China in Japan negotiated with Shojiro Fujii
and purchased the land and the building at the price of 2,500,000
Japanese yens, on May 27, 1950. The residents agreed to transfer
registration of ownership as soon as possible, and in turn, they paid
Shojiro Fujii on the same day. A transfer form for the land and6 the
building was executed and a receipt for the money was issued.1
Before the registration by the parties of the purchase and sale was
effected, Japan concluded a "Treaty of Peace" with the already overthrown "Republic of China" in April 1952. The Office of the Resident
Representative of China was dissolved when the "embassy of the
Republic of China" illegally took over its function. As Shojiro Fujii
demanded money in addition to the sum already paid, another contract
dated December 8, 1952, for the purchase and sale of the land and
building was made. However, the "Ambassador" of the authorities in
Taiwan filed a suit in the name of "the Republic of China" claiming
registration of the transfer of ownership because the registration had
not been undertaken. The plaintiff won this suit and the registration
of the purchase and sale of December 8, 1952, was effectuated on
June 8, 1961.
In 1966, the plaintiff sent a notice to the resident students from
China requesting them to vacate the building or to conclude a lease
contract because "the [Self-]Managing Committee had been obstructing
the administration of the building by the "Consulate-General of the
Republic of China in Osaka" since May or June 1965. The Self-Governing Committee of the Guanghua Liao building had long undertaken
all recruiting, management, and administration of the building, while
the plaintiff and/or the "Consulate-General in Osaka" never took part
17
in the management.
B.

The Initiation of the Action

1. Plaintiffs Initiation of the Action
On September 6, 1967, an action was brought before the Kyoto
District Court by the so-called "Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of China to Japan," Ch'6n Chih-mai,
on behalf of the so-called "Republic of China," against Yu Ping-huan
and seven other members of the Self-Governing Committee of the
Guanghua Liao building in question. The plaintiff requested that defen-

16.
17.

Qiwu, supra note 7; see also 22 J.A.I.L. at 154.
Qiwu, supra note 7; see also 22 J.A.I.L. at 154-55.
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dants vacate the land and the building 18 alleging that plaintiff purchased the land and the building from the former owner, Goshikaisha
Rakuto Apartment, on December 8, 1952, and plaintiffs ownership
was registered on June 8, 1961.19
2. Defendants' Contentions
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs action on the ground
that, although the plaintiff referred to itself as "the Republic of China,"
the "Republic of China ceased to exist on October 1, 1949, when the
People's Republic of China came into existence," and that the latter
was the sole Government representing the Chinese people. Therefore,
argued the defendants, the plaintiff did not have the capacity to be a
party to the present claim. The defendants further argued that it was
a widely accepted principle of international law that when a new Government is established as a result of a revolution or of a "coup d'etat,"
and is further recognized by a foreign Government, the ownership of
public property which previously belonged to the former Government
should be transferred to the new Government established. It was
argued that the Guanghua Liao, the building, was public property
because the facilities were provided by the Chinese Government for
its people. The residence of the defendants had a public nature too.
The dormitory was established in order to achieve public objectives:
to lodge students studying abroad, to assist those students in their
studies, and to train able persons for the State. The defendants further
contended that although at a time the then "Republic of China," as a
Government with the status of representing China, had owned the
property, the ownership of the property had been transferred, as a
matter of course, to the People's Republic of China with the switch
of recognition by the Japanese Government from the "Republic of
China" to the People's Republic of China. Therefore, the plaintiff had
no ground for claiming ownership.It was undeniable that the land and the building were public property for public use, considering the source of the money allotted for
the purchase and the purpose of the building. China purchased the
21
property to be used as a dormitory for Chinese students in Japan.

18.
19.
20.
21.

22 J.A.I.L. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 152-53.
Id. at 155.
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The 1977 Judgment of the Kyoto District Court

On September 16, 1977, the Kyoto District Court decided the Guanghua Liao case against the plaintiff, ruling that the plaintiff had no
rights to protect the property in question and that its claims had to
be dismissed.22 The Court reasoned that since the Japanese Government recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China
as the sole legitimate Government in China, the Government's right
to the property which was publicly owned by China, were transferred
to the Government of the People's Republic of China and were removed
from the ownership of the "Government of the Republic of China."
C.

Problematic Proceedings

1. The Osaka High Court's Reversal (1982)
Refusing to accept the Kyoto District Court's judgment, the authorities in Taiwan appealed to the Osaka High Court in October
1977.?A The authorities, represented by the "Chief of the Bureau of
State Properties of the Ministry of Finance," made the appeal in the
name of "the Republic of China."
Realistically speaking, the original judgment by the Kyoto District
Court was practical and complied with the principles stated in the
Joint Communiqu6 and with principles of international law.2 Itgoes
without saying that, after the normalization of the Sino-Japanese relations, the Japanese Government should have taken cooperative steps
in assisting the People's Republic of China to go through the registration procedure for the purpose of property transfer. Additionally, the
Japanese courts should have avoided any acceptance and hearing of
claims instituted by the so-called "Republic of China."

22. Id. at 156. See also Haopei, supra note 3; Qiwu, supra note 7.
23. 22 J.A.LL. at 155-56. See also Haopei, supra note 3; Qiwu, supra note 7.
24. See Haopei, supra note 3; Qiwu, supra note 7.
25. It should be noted here, however, that the Kyoto District Court failed to refuse the
plaintiff the access to the Court as a party. Rather, it wrongly allowed the suit to proceed,
and added the following wrong opinion to the judgment dismissing the plaintiffs claims:
[I]t is an unquestionable fact that the plaintiff still dominates Formosa and the
surrounding islands and continues a de facto State, and such would encounter no
problem in seeking settlement by the Japanese Court of disputes arising from
international private transactions and others, and thus it is not necessary to deny
the capacity of the plaintiff to be a party.
22 J.A.I.L. at 156. This statement somewhat contradicts with the Kyoto District Court's acknowledgment in its judgment that the Government of the People's Republic of China is recognized
by Japan as the sole legitimate Government of China, that the Japanese Government returned
the Taiwan area to China, and understands and respects the allegation of the People's Republic
of China that the Taiwan should be considered a part of China. Id. at 155.
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Regrettably, the Japanese Government failed to do so. More seriously and surprisingly, not only did the Osaka High Court accept the
illegal appeal brought by the authorities in Taiwan on. behalf of the
"Republic of China," but it also took unlawful judicial cognizance of
that local regime as being a de facto "government. '26 Moreover, on
April 14, 1982, the High Court came to a groundless decision to reserve
the lower Court's original judgment of September 16, 1977, and remanded the lawsuit to the Kyoto District Court for retrial.2
2. The 1986 Judgment of the Kyoto District Court
In order to find a pretext for its illegal acceptance of the case and
its incorrect decision, the Osaka High Court invented a series of
grounds. The Court said that "since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Government of the Republic of China has exclusively controlled and governed Taiwan and the surrounding islands
and the people thereon." The Court also said that the plaintiff was
"an unrecognized de facto government," and in international practice
such a non-recognized government may be cognizable by, and has a
right to litigate in, foreign courts. Finally, the Court said that even
if the Government of the People's Republic of China had been recognized by the Japanese Government as the sole legitimate Government
of China, it could not maintain its right of succession to the properties
located in a third country like Japan and owned by the former Chinese
Government because the People's Republic of China's succession was
partial.2 Based on these grounds invented by the High Court, the
Kyoto District Court retried the case and ruled in favor of the plaintiff
on February 4, 1986. The Court held that the Guanghua Liao dormitory, China's State property, belonged to the authorities in Taiwan,
altering its entire original judgment.3.

The 1987 Decision of the Osaka High Court

On the appeal brought by the Guanghua Liao resident defendants,
the Osaka High Court disregarded the Chinese Government's sole and
just representations and sincere advise. The Court maintained its incorrect stand, and on February 26, 1987, it made another erroneous
decision affirming the District Court's judgment of February 4, 1986,
and continued to treat the authorities in Taiwan as a "government."
It persisted in its invention of "grounds" which were now contained
26.

Qiwu, supra note 7.

27.

See Haopei, supra note 3; Qiwu, supra note 7.

28.

See Zhu, supra note 12; Qiwu, supra note 7.

29.

Id.
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in the District Court's opinion on the case, stating that the building
belonged to "the Republic of China." °
The legal foundations of the Sino-Japanese Relations were being
wantonly destroyed and the rules of international law were greatly
trampled on. As a result of the Japanese courts' acts which brazenly
violated agreements with the two countries as well as international
law and which deliberately created "two Chinas" or "one China and
one Taiwan," the Chinese unavoidably felt surprise, regret, and unease.
Another appeal was made by the eight Chinese resident defendants
to the Supreme Court of Japan on March 11, 1987. The present case
(April 30, 1989) is still pending for final judicial decision.31 A group of
counsels for the Chinese side, composed of 11 noted Japanese attorneys, was formed in Tokyo on May 27, 1987. 2 On May 30, 1987, the
grounds for appeal were submitted to the Supreme Court of Japan
by the attorneys for the defendant-appellant Chinese residents, which
demanded that the Osaka High Court's judgment of February 26,
1987, be dismissed, because the judgment violated the Japanese Constitution and other legal provisions, and contained misinterpretations
of laws, and contradictions among the "grounds" created by the Osaka
High Court.3
D.

Locus Standi Questioned: The Primary Issue

The Japanese courts' acts in taking judicial notice of the local
Taiwanese authorities, a self-claimed "government" not recognized as
such by Japan, and in allowing said local authorities to bring illegal
lawsuits under the name of the "Republic of China," are a serious
violation of the basic principles stated in the Joint Communiqud and
affirmed in the Peace and Friendship Treaty. This constitutes an obvious deviation from the generally accepted and applied rule that a
non-recognized or derecognized State or Government cannot sue in
the courts of the non-recognizing State.

30. Id. See also Xinhua News Agency, supra note 7.
31. China News Agency, Zhu Zai Guanghua Liao De Zhonghua Liaoshenge Xiang Riben
Zuigao Fayuan Tichu Shangsu (The Chinese Residents in the Guanghua Liao Appealed to the
Supreme Court of Japan), People's Daily, Mar. 13, 1987, at 6.
32. Xinhua News Agency, "Guanghua Liao An" Zhong Fang Bianhu Tuan Chengli (The
GuanghuaLiao Case: Counseling Group for the Chinese Side Set Up), People's Daily, May 29,
1987, at 6.
33. Xinhua News Agency, Guanghua Liao An Shangsu Ren Bianhu Lushi Tuan Shangsu,
Yaoqiu Riben Zuigao Fayuan Chexiao Cuopan (The Guanghua Laio Case: The Counseling
Groupfor the Appellants Submitted Grounds of Appeals, Demanding the Japanese Supreme
Court to Reserve the Erroneous Decisions), People's Daily, June 1, 1987, at 1 & 6.
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Now that the Japanese Government has recognized that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate Government of China, of which Taiwan is an inalienable part, it should
have fully realized and foreseen the international obligations arising
from its act of recognition and the legal consequences thereof. According to Professor Li Haopei, a well-known legal advisor to the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the answer is definite to the question of
whether the Japanese courts could allow the so-called "Republic of
China," which no longer exists either de jure or de facto, and which
is not recognized by the Japanese Government, to appear as plaintiff
and appellant before the Japanese courts. Due to the Joint Communiqu6 and the Peace and Friendship Treaty between the two countries, Japan has accorded de jure recognition to the Government of
the People's Republic of China. This indicates that the local authorities
in Taiwan have entirely lost the capacity in Japan to represent this
particular international person known as China and have therefore
lost all international rights that a Government enjoys. "The Japanese
courts' recognition of the local authorities in Taiwan as a government
in their decisions, and their allowing that r6gime to be the plaintiff
and appellant in the current case, are both in breach of the obligation
provided for in the above-mentioned two treaties under which Japan
recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the
sole legitimate Government of China, and [these acts] are therefore
illegal as well."- Just as Professor Zhao Lihai of Peking University
puts it in his persuasive article:
According to international law, one of the legal consequences
of recognition of a government is that, to the recognizing
State, the old and overthrown regime of the recognized State
is no longer existing in law, and has thus lost its right and
capacity to sue in the courts of the recognizing State.w
To be more specific for the purpose of the present case, to Japan,
the so-called "Republic of China" had long ago become extinct in law
and has no locus standi in Japanese courts. Therefore, continues Professor Zhao, "[The local Taiwanese authorities] are not entitled at all
to institute proceedings in the courts of Japan, under the name of a
State or Government concerning the Guanghua Liao building, our

34. Haopei, supra note 3.
35. Lihai, Riben Fayuan dui Guanghua Liao An De Panjue Yanzhong Weifan Guoji Fa
(The Japanese Courts' Trials Over the Guanghua Liao Case Seriously Violated International
Law), People's Daily, Mar. 6, 1987, at 1 & 4.
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State property, and still less the Japanese courts should not have
accepted and heard this case."
The Japanese judges seem to have racked their brains in every
effort for apt legal precedents, attempting: (1) to prove that in international practice an unrecognized government may be cognizable by,
and may be allowed access to, the courts of the non-recognizing State,
and (2) to find theoretical and practical grounds for their acceptance
and hearing of the suit unlawfully brought before them by the extinct
"Republic of China. 3 6 The ironic fact, however, is that most legal
scholars uphold the "non-access by the unrecognized" principle, and
most pertinent judicial decisions of various municipal courts tell us:
(1) that on the question of recognition of States or Government, the
judiciary in any State is powerless to make initial and independent
judgments without looking to the attitude of the executive branch of
the Government, because it has to act in unison with the positions
held by the executive, and (2) that a non-recognized or derecognized
Government or regime may not institute proceedings in the courts of
the State withholding or having withdrawn such recognition.
This has become a customary rule of international law and has
widely been accepted and followed. Only under extraordinary circumstances have there been a few exceptions to this rule. However,
these exceptions themselves, by the very nature of their exceptionality, explain that the rule of non-access by the unrecognized has become
a general one. Otherwise, what we call "exceptions" would not be as
such and would therefore be meaningless.
Moreover, as we will notice, none of the exceptional or seemingly
exceptional cases of which we are aware are similar or applicable to
the Guanghua Liao case. These exceptions do not constitute grounds
for the Osaka High Court. Furthermore, most of the exceptions or
seeming exceptions have in fact, in one way or another, affirmed the
basic principle of non-accessibility. As for the rest of those exceptions,
we are still unable to find anything contrary to the essence of the
non-access principle.
Anyone having common knowledge of international law can see the
illegality and the unreasonableness of the Japanese courts' acts in
allowing the local Taiwanese authorities to appear before them to seek
possession of the public property belonging to the State of China and
in granting the authorities the status of the State or Government and
ownership to the above property. These are obvious illegal acts on
t he part of the Japanese courts in violation
of the Sino-Japanese Joint

36.

See Qiwu, supra note 7; see also Zhu, supra note 12.
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Communiqu6 and the Peace and Friendship Treaty and in disregard
of the rules, particularly the non-access rule, of international law.
To further explain the illegal and unreasonable nature of the
Japanese courts' judgments, particularly their departure from the general non-access rule, it is necessary here to observe and analyze: 1)
the general attitudes of writers of international law toward, or their
general views on, the issue of accessibility or non-accessibility; 2)
relevant judicial decisions representing the general international practice on this matter; and 3) some exceptions or seeming exceptions to
the general rule and practice.
IV.

THE NON-ACCESS PRINCIPLE AS EVIDENCED BY OPINIONS
OF WRITERS

The principle that unrecognized States or Governments cannot sue
in the courts of the non-recognizing States is a long established practice
and principle and finds its expression in numerous works of international law. As early as the 1920s, John J. Hervey, an American lawyer
and scholar, studied a great number of cases relating to the question
of recognition and its legal consequences in international law. One of
the conclusions he made was that, "[a] recognized state with a recognized government may sue in the courts of a recognizant state. Recognized states with unrecognized governments should not be permitted
to sue where the political departments of the non-recognizant government have declared against the de facto situation. ''1 7 In other words,
"recognition is necessary before a state or government can assert its
fundamental rights of independence, existence and intercourse through
diplomatic channels or through the courts of foreign states."Hersley Lauterpacht, the late authoritative writer of international
law and former judge of the International Court of Justice, was of
the opinion that a non-recognized State or Government and its decrees
do not have de facto existence in the courts of a foreign State, and
most municipal courts of various countries have dismissed the right
to sue by a non-recognized State or Government. 9 This opinion was
also reflected in Oppenheim's standard textbook under Lauterpacht's
editorship.4°
37.

J.

HERVEY, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

137

& 157 (1928).
38. Id. at 156.
H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (1947).
See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 137-38 (H. LAUTERPACHT 8th ed. 1958).
The relevant paragraph here reads as follows:
Among the more important consequences which flow from the recognition of a new
Government or State are these . . . (3) it thereby acquires the right, which ...
39.

40.
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Starke, an international well-known publicist and professor of
humanitarian law, shares this view by stating that:
[tlhe principal legal disability of an unrecognized state or
government may be enumerated as follows:
a. It cannot sue in the courts of a state which has not
recognized it, . . .
b. By reason of the same principle, the acts of an
unrecognized state or government will not generally be
given in the courts of a non-recognizing state the effect
customary according to the rules of 'comity.'
c. Its representatives cannot claim immunity from

legal process ....41

According to Professor Starke, it is recognition that transmutes
all these disabilities into the "full status of a sovereign State or Government. '' 4 2 When speaking of unrecognized States or Governments,
Lauterpacht and Starke would of course, it is believed, include those
which were formerly recognized but were later derecognized. This is
exactly the case with the local Taiwanese authorities' status in Japan.
In his well-read Principles of Public International Law, Ian
Brownlie, another famous English professor of international law, correctly states, "[w]ithin the sphere of domestic law, recognition may
have important practical consequences. Where the local courts are
willing or are, as a matter of public law, obliged to follow the advice
of the executive, the unrecognized State or Government cannot claim
immunity from the jurisdiction, obtain recognition (for purposes of
conflict of laws) of its legislative and judicial acts or sue in the local
courts as plaintiff." [Emphasis added]. Only in exceptional (and very
few) occasions, has a non-recognized State or Government been accorded conditional procedural competence and immunity.The same stand is shared by Professor Gerhard Von Glahn who
holds that:

it did not previously possess, of suing in the courts of law of the recognizing State;
(4) it thereby acquires for itself and its property immunity from the jurisdiction
of the courts of law of the State recognizing it and the ancillary rights . . . an
immunity which . . . it does not enjoy before recognition; (5) it [also] becomes
entitled to demand and receive possession of property situate[d] within the jurisdiction of a recognizing State, which formerly belonged to the preceding Government at the time of its supersession.)
41. STARKE, supra note 1, at 142 (Emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (3rd ed. 1979).
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the failure of a government to be recognized by foreign
governments produces definite legal consequences, well established through numerous court decisions . . . . It has
been established beyond question that a non-recognized government does not possess a right of access to the courts of
such other states as deny it recognition, i.e., and unrecognized governments cannot sue in such courts . . . . Once
recognition has been extended to a new government, the
latter has access to the courts of the recognizing state."
Similarly, in their treatise The Political Foundations of International Law, Professors Kaplan and Katzenbach point out that recognition of a Government normally results in access to State funds on
deposit in recognizing States, access to courts of, and immunity from
judicial process in, such States. "The absence of formal recognition
has the effect of suspending most or all of these rights in so far as
the non-recognizing State controls them. '" 45 In a recent article English
writer F.A. Mann also recognizes that "[i]n law,... the non-recognized
State does not exist. It is . . . a nullity," and enjoys no standing
before the courts of the non-recognizing State.46
Even Japanese publicists hold the view that a derecognized State
or Government does not enjoy procedural capacity in the courts of the
derecognizing State. For example, International Law Professor
Shoichi Sekino of Japan's National College University writes that "[i]f
the party is a state or government which does not possess the legal
personality in international law, it surely is incapable of claiming rights
to state property. '47 In his opinion, distinctions should further be made
between an "unrecognized de facto government" and a "derecognized
government." While a de facto government subject to foreign recognition may have different procedural rights in foreign courts, a "derecognized government" enjoys no such rights at all in the courts of a
derecognizing state." In his opinion, a non-recognized defacto government is a government that has replaced the predecessor government

44.

G.

VON GLAHN,

LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNA-

109 (3rd ed. 1976).
M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE

TIONAL LAW

45.
LAW

POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL

121 (1961).

46. Mann, The JudicialRecognition of an Unrecognized State, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 151
(1987).
47. Sekino, Guanghua Liao Wenti de Jiaodianyu Jijian (The Central Points in the Guanghua Liao Issue and My PersonalView), Legal Rep., Feb. 1988 (Japan), translatedand digested
in People's Daily, Mar. 26, 1988, at 2.

48.

Id.
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through revolutionary means or the like, and has established its effective control in its state, but has not been recognized by foreign states.
Typical examples of unrecognized de facto governments include the
early Soviet Government which had overthrown the Tzar regime by
the Soviet Revolution, and had established effective control over the
whole territory of Russia, but had not received recognition from
foreign states. Another example is the Government of the People's
Republic of China which replaced the Nationalist Government through
revolutionary civil war and had been exercising firm and effective
control over part of the Chinese territory since then, although Western
powers had been withholding recognition until the 1970s.
Sure, an unrecognized Government by definition has not been
granted foreign diplomatic recognition, but as a general de facto Government with firm and effective control over the country, it is a factual
existence. It is generally appropriate for the courts of the non-recognizing state to grant procedural status to such unrecognized de facto
Governments on one occasion or another. In the case of a "derecognized
Government," it denotes an old Government that, according to the
principle of "one state, one Government," has naturally lost the status
of a legitimate Government as a result of the recognition of the new
Government in its replacement. A "derecognized Government" also
denotes a former Government that has been withdrawn recognition
49
by foreign States due to other reasons.

The principle of non-access is supported not only by western writers, but also by publicists of the third world countries. While Professor
Wang Tieya ° and Professor Zhao Lihais5 of Peking University are the
typical Chinese xamples, publicists from other third world countries
might have more persuasive power. Professor Pavithran of India, for
example, is of the opinion that "[t]he effect of non-recognition of governments, as in the case of States, is seen in the courts of the States
refusing recognition. The unrecognized Government, like the unrecognized State, is not permitted to appear as a plaintiff in the Courts of
the State withholding Recognition." 2

49. Id.
50. In a discussion meeting between noted activists and experts from China and Japan,
Professor Wang Tieya expressed his view that the legal issue in the Guanghua Liao case is a
rather simple one: according to international law, a non-recognized state. Denying access of the
Taiwan authorities as the suitor to Japanese courts would solve the entire issue. See Zhong Ri
Minjian Renshi Tan Guanghua Liao Wenti (Chinese and JapaneseNon-Governmental Activists
on the Guanghua Liao Issue), People's Daily, Apr. 30, 1988, at 1.
51. See Lihai, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
52. A. PAVITHRAN, SUBSTANCE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: WESTERN AND
EASTERN

181 (Bombay 1965).
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The view held by a noted African scholar and politician, Nkambo
Mugerwa, might be more typical. What he observed is that "in most
countries the judiciary will be guided by the attitude of the executive
branch of government" on issues relating to recognition or non-recognition. "If a certificate is produced from the Foreign Ministry on the
question whether or not the new state or government has been recognized, the court will accept it." Although practice varies from State
to State, "[t]he general rule is . . . that unrecognized states and

governments enjoy no rights before the courts of the state refusing
recognition . .

.

. If we examine the various issues which may arise

before a national court, we find that the right to sue is often, if not
invariably, refused to an unrecognized government. '" 3
As to the question whether the judiciary is bound by the executive's
decisions and actions in matters relating to such issues as recognition
of foreign States or Governments, it is helpful to emphasize the opinions of some. According to Starke, it is a common practice that on
the question of recognition, the court should consult the executive on
the principle that it must act in unison with the "will of the national
sovereignty," which is expressed in external affairs through the executive alone. To hold otherwise might lead to a conflict between the
courts and the executive at the expense of national interests.Hervey also pointed out that
[t]he recognition function is vested in the political departments of the government and may be exercised at their
discretion. The judicial branch must act in unison with the
political departments in the conduct of foreign relations. Once
those departments have acted, whether favorably or unfavorably, the courts are bound thereby. The courts cannot entertain evidence as to the competency or incompetency of a
recognized foreign government. 5
It is only in the absence of a definite attitude, either favorable or
unfavorable, on the part of the political departments, that the courts
may have a choice of certain alternatives. They may either regard
"the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered," or deny completely the existence of state life, or evaluate the governmental competency as a matter of fact.5

53. N. Mugerwa, Subjects of InternationalLaw, in M.
INTERNATIONAL LAW

54.
55.
56.

SORENSEN,

MANUAL OF PUBLIC

247, 273 (New York: St. Martin's Press 1968).

See J. STARKE, supra note 1, at 143.
J. HERVEY, supra note 37, at 156.
Id. at 156.
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Professor Sekino of Japan also supports the theory of "judicial
self-restriction" under which the question of recognition is an exclusive
matter with the executive branch of the government and courts should
avoid making different judgments contrary to the Government's position. The reasons for this theory, he commented, include: 1) for the
purpose of reasonableness and policy, it is necessary for the courts to
co-ordinate with the government in matters involving foreign relations
and policy; 2) the constitution only empowers the executive branch of
the government to handle recognition and other foreign-related issues;
and 3) foreign-related issues are primarily political (rather than legal)
ones, and are not apt for the courts to decide upon. Therefore, according to Professor Sekino, if it can be established that the Guanghua
Liao case touches upon the question of recognition of the Chinese
Government and the question of China's State sovereignty, the courts
should look to the executive department of the Government for correct
7
judgments and solutions..
It should be clear enough now that a wide variety of writers on
international law maintain that a non-recognized State or Government
cannot appear in the courts of other States on behalf of a subject of
international law. An inseparable point with this is that judicial activities in a court must be contrary to the foreign policy of the State,
and must not be in conflict with the executive's actions and decisions.
The courts have a duty to follow the executive branch which decides
the State's foreign policy, and they also have a duty to refuse procedural rights to the unrecognized Government. In fact, this position,
commonly shared by international legal scholars, is the generalization
and summation of the general international practice u
V.

THE NON-ACCESS PRINCIPLE AS ESTABLISHED BY JUDICIAL
DECISIONS OF MUNICIPAL COURTS

A.

Early Decisions

The decisions setting the non-access principle may be traced back,
at least, to the famous English case of 1804, City of Berne v. Bank
of England,59 where the plaintiff moved for an injunction to restrain
the defendant from dealing with certain funds, standing in their names
under a purchase by the old Government of Berne before the Revolution. The defendant argued that the existing Government of Switzerland, not being acknowledged by the Government of Great Britain,

57. Sekino, supra note 47.
58. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
59. 9 Vessey Jr. 347 (1804), 32 Eng. Rep. 636.
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could not be noticed by the Court. The English Court of Chancery,
refusing to make the order for the plaintiff, ruled that "it was extremely difficult to say, a judicial Court can take notice of a [foreign]
Government, never authorized by the Government of the Country, in
which that Court sits ..... ,6 A note to that case indicated that this
rule was followed in 1823 in a suit brought by persons representing
themselves against the Colombian Government, which was not recog6
nized by the Government of Great Britain at that time. '
Another early example on point is Jones v. GarciaDel Rio, 62 where
Lord Chancellor Eldon stated: "What right have I, as the King's judge,
to interfere upon the subject of a contract with a country which he
does not recognize." In Taylor v. Barclay,6 a bill in equity was based
on an agreement which had been made in 1825 by agents of "the
Government of the Federated Republic of Central America."- On demurrer, Vice Chancellor Shadwell dismissed the bill, saying that he
had consulted the Foreign Office, and was "authorized to state that
the Federal Republic of Central America" had not been recognized as
a Government by the Government of his country. In the absence of
recognition, the application was therefore disallowed.- In many other
subsequent cases, the principle set forth in City of Berne v. Bank of
67
England was repeatedly followed, affirmed, applied or embodied.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

9 Vessey Jr. 347, 348, 32 Eng. Rep. 636, 636-37.
32 Eng. Rep. at 637.
1 Turn. & Rus. 297 (Ch. 1823), 37 Eng. Rep. 1113.
1 Turn. & Rus. 297, 299 (Ch.1823), 37 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1114.
2 Sim. 213 (1828), 57 Eng. Rep. 769.

65.

Id.

66. The Court held that a false allegation should not be given intended effect, and the
Federated Republic of Central America not acknowledged as such by the British Government
should not be taken judicial notice of. 2 Sim. at 220-23, 57 Eng. Rep. at 771-72.
67. There were a number of other cases in which the courts held that the foreign power
to sue depended on recognition or the test of its sovereignty to sue was its recognition, which
meant that in the absence of recognition, no action could be brought. In Republic of Mexico v.
De Arrangois, 11 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 1, 12 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (5 Duer) 634 (1856), the New York
Superior Court held:
A republic acknowledged as such by our government, is an independent sovereign
power; . . .to deny to any foreign state, whose independence and sovereignty as
such are acknowledged by our own government, and with whom we are at peace,

the right to prosecute its just claims in a court of justice ... would be something
more than a violation, if not of the terms, of our federal constitution . . .[and]
would furnish a very grave subject of remonstrance and complaint, and . . .might
even be deemed a just cause of war.
5 Duer at 634, 636-38 (Emphasis added).
See also The Hornet, 12 F. Cas. 529 (1870) (No. 6705); The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
164 (1871), discussed in infra notes 115-19 and accompanying texts; Republic of Honduras v.
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Special Cases Relating to the Soviet Government

In order to "justify" their unreasonable decisions in the Guanghua
Liao case, the Japanese courts particularly enumerated some cases
relating to the procedural rights of the Soviet Government in other
countries in the 1920s and the 1930s. This is a way of confusing and
misleading the public. Some historical facts need to be clarified here.
1. Decisions of Common Law Courts
Following the non-recognition policy of some Western Powers in
a period of time after the Soviet regime gained power in Russia, the
issue whether the Soviet Government or its agent or arm could sue
in the courts of those non-recognizing countries was massively raised
and sometimes differently solved. However, one thing is clear: where
the executive branch of the Government had expressly refused recognition, the courts accordingly always refused to permit the Soviet
Government or its agents to bring suits before them. The Penza &
The Tobolsk- and The Rogdai69 involve, two actions in rem brought
by agents of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic for possession of three steamers. The actions were dismissed on the ground
that the United States continued to recognize the defunct Provisional
Government of Russia.
In The Penza & The Tobolsk, the U.S. District Court in New
York held that since the United States Government continued to recognize the Provisional Government of Russia and Boris Bakhmeteff
as its ambassador in Washington, and since the United States Government had not recognized the Soviet Republic, Mr. Ludwig C.A.K.
Martens, the agent and representative of the Soviet Republic, did not
have "the capacity to sue as such." The court further explained that
judicial notice would be taken of the action of the political department
of the Government and their representatives. The decision of the political department was binding upon the judicial department. "The

Soto, 112 N.Y. 310, 19 N.E. 845, 112 N.Y. 310, 311 (1889) ("It is not disputed but that the
plaintiff is an independent government, recognized as such by the United States, and capable
of . . . bringing and maintaining actions in the courts of this country.") (emphasis added);
Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 De G.F. J. 217; Matte et Ross v. Socit6 de Forges, etc., 18 J.
de dr. int. 868, 881-82; Republic of Chile v. Rothschild, [1891] W.N. 138, The Times, July 4,
1891; Yucatan v. Agrumendo, 92 Misc. 547, 157 N.Y.S. 219 (1915); Waldes v. Basch, 109 Misc.
306, 179 N.Y.S. 713, 716 (1919) (it is the rule that "recognition either of belligerency or independence is a political act, which must be exercised by the political branches of government, the
executive and legislative"), affd in 191 App. Div. (N.Y.) 904, 181 N.Y.S. 958 (1920).
68. 277 F. 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1921), reprinted in 1 Ann. Dig. 53 (1919-1922), Case No. 28.
69. 278 F. 294 (1921), 279 F. 130, reprinted in 1 Ann. Dig. 51 (1919-1922), Case No. 27;

M.

HUDSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
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courts," said the Court "must follow and may not lead the executive.
They have no authority to institute an original inquiry into the conditions of a foreign state or government . . . . But the legislative and
executive department of any government by its decision or action
binds the judiciary." Due to the very fact of non-recognition, the court
held that the Soviet Republic could not maintain its rights in the
United States courts, and its alleged agent and representative would
have no better rights than his principal.7°
Similarly, in The Rogdai, the U.S. District Court in California
refused to grant the relief sought by the representative of the Soviet
Government.71 The court did not question the ownership of the Rogdai.
Rather, it questioned whether it could deem the Soviet Government
as the one representing the Russian nation while the United States
Government recognized the Provisional Government of Russia. 72 The
answer was given in the negative because the executive branch of the
U.S. Government was the sole competent organ entitled to recognize
another State or Government, and the court could not act in deviation
73
from the Government's position in this kind of matter.
The court also stated that there could not be more than one Government to represent a single State simultaneously. "True, the Russian
sovereignty may speak through different representatives, and it may
have business agents as well as diplomatic agents but all must derive
their authority from a single source. The national will must be expressed through a single organization; two conflicting 'governments'
cannot function at the same time." 74 Accordingly, the Court held that
'75
it was "powerless to grant the relief which the litigant sought.

70. 277 F. at 92, 94 ('The Soviet Republic never having been recognized as a sovereign
state by this Government, it may not maintain this label in the federal courts. Its alleged agent
would have no better or greater rights than his principal.")
71. 278 F. at 296, 1 Ann. Dig. at 52.
72. Id. According to the Court, "there is no controversy touching real ownership of the
transport; she belongs to Russia." By saying Russia, the Court did not refer to any particular
group or organization, but to the "national entity or sovereignty." The issue was, whether the
Russian nation was represented by Ludwig C.A.K. Martens and the organization back of him
or by Boris Bakhmeteff and the group for which he spoke.
73. Id. The Court said:
If the Court assumes the right to make an original inquiry... it logically follows
it must exercise its own independent judgment upon the facts thus disclosed and
reach an independent conclusion. In that view it might recognize Martens, while
Washington recognizes Bakhmeteff. . . . [T]he question when, if at all, such de
facto government shall be recognized, is a political one, . . . and touching it the
voice of the Chief Executive is the voice, not of a branch of the government, but
of the national sovereignty, equally binding upon all departments.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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The most famous case on point concerning the Soviet regime is
76
held to be Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario.
In 1918, the Cinematographic Committee of the Commissariat of Public
Instruction of the Soviet Government paid to the United States commercial attach6 in Petrogra, Dr. William C. Huntington, $1,000,000
which was to be deposited in the National City Bank of New York.
The defendant, Jaques Roberto Cibrario, then the purchasing agent
of the Cinematographic Committee in the United States, entered into
an agreement with the Soviet Republic to supply the plaintiff Government with films for educational purposes, and thus had the privilege
of drawing on the account of the National City Bank. But later on,
the defendant converted about half of the initial deposit to his personal
account.
The Soviet Republic brought an action in the New York State
Supreme Court seeking to compel an accounting by the defendant.From an order granting an injunction and appointing a receiver, the
defendant appealed to the Appellate Division of the New York State
Supreme Court. The court held that the order had to be reversed and
dismissed the action because the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republic had not been recognized by the United States, and a non-recognized Government had no standing to sue in American courts.78 On
appeal by the plaintiff, the Appellate Division's judgment was affirmed.7 9 Judge Andrews of the New York Court of Appeals, wrote
an opinion for the court, holding that a foreign Government could not
demand permission to sue in the United States courts as a matter of
right. This privilege was yielded as a favor to the nation according

76. 198 App. Div. (N.Y.) 869, 191 N.Y.S. 543 (1921), affd in 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259
(1923), reprinted in 2 Ann. Dig. 41 (1923-1924), Case No. 17, M. HUDSON, CASES AND OTHER
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 (1936).
77. 198 App. Div. (N.Y.) at 870-71, 191 N.Y.S. at 544, 2 Ann. Dig. at 41-42.
78. 198 App. Div. (N.Y.) at 873, 878, 880, 191 N.Y.S. at 545, 548-51, 2 Ann. Dig. at 42.
The Appellate Division stated: "[I]t follows that plaintiff, never having been recognized as a
sovereign by the executive or legislative branches of the United States government, has no
capacity to sue in the courts of the United States." 198 App. Div. (N.Y.) at 880. The Appellate
Division's judgment was based on the theory that the power to sue depended on recognition,
without it the court could not know that the suitor was government:
In the case at bar, while plaintiff claims to be a de facto government, and its title
and right to sue alike rest on that claim, it is unable to show any acts of recognition
by the government of this country. On the contary, the record proves that, so far
as this country is concerned, the plaintiff is non existent as a sovereign.
Id. at 878. The court also held that "[tihe question of whether the plaintiff is a sovereign State
must be determined by ... reference to the public acts of the executive and legislative departments of the Government, of which the courts are bound to take judicial notice." Id. at 873.
79. 235 N.Y. 255, 258 (1923), 139 N.E. 259, 260, reprinted in 2 Ann. Dig. 41, 42.
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to the rules of comity. "In the absence of recognition no comity exists."
The right to sue depends on comity, and in the absence of comity
there is no such right. The court concluded:
[A] foreign power brings an action in our Court not as a
matter of right. Its power to do so is the creature of comity.
Until such Government is recognized by the United States,
no such comity exists. The plaintiff concededly has not been
so recognized. There is, therefore, no proper party before
us . . . . [R]ecognition and consequently the existence of
comity is purely a matter for the determination of the legislative or executive departments of the government 0
After the Appellate Division rendered the decision in the Cibrario
case described above, 81 an attempt was made to recover on the same
facts by bringing a separate action in the names of the individuals
who were members of the Cinematographic Committee when the contract was made. This attempt also failed because, according to the
court, the Soviet Republic or the Committee's right to bring an action
on the agreement had been extinguished. Furthermore, the Committee
or its members could have no greater right than the principal, the
Soviet Government.
2.

Decisions of Civil Law Courts

The above practice concerning the procedural status of the then
unrecognized Soviet Government is found not only in common law
countries, but also in those having civil law traditions. One example
is Soviet Government v. Ericsson.3 In 1919, M. Vorovsky, the
"D Igu. P~nipotentiaire du Consel des Commissaires du Peuple," in
said capacity, sued A. Ericsson, a Swedish subject, before the Court
of Stockholm. Vorovsky contended that during his negotiations with
the Swedish Government to obtain permission to acquire a house being
built, Ericsson bought the house and had it registered in his name.
However, the acquisition was made in the interest of the Soviet Government, and Vorovsky had paid the price and the cost of completing
the building. Vorovsky, therefore, asked for a judgment against
Ericsson for the payment of the expenses incurred. The Court of
Stockholm denied the plaintiff's right to sue on the ground that the

80.

235 N.Y. at 262, 139 N.E. at 262, 2 Ann. Dig. at 42 43. (Emphasis added).

81. Id.

82.
83.

Preobazhenski v. Cibrario, 192 N.Y.S. 275 (1922), noted in 2 Ann. Dig. 41, 42, n.1.
1 Ann. Dig. 54 (1919-1922), Case No. 30.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

25

Florida Journal of
International
Law, Vol. LAW
5, Iss.JOURNAL
3 [1990], Art. 5
FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL

[Vol. 5

Swedish did not recognize the Soviet Government.'8 The Swedish Supreme Court subsequently upheld the judgment of the lower court. s5
Another similar decision is found in Socitd Despa et Fils v.
U.R.S.S. by the Court of Appeal of Liege, Belgium.8 6 This was an
appeal from a decision of the Commercial Tribunal of Verviers to
entertain an action instituted by the plaintiff, Russia, on behalf of its
commercial representation in France with regard to a contract for
furnishing carried out by the defendant Socit6 Despa et Fils, a Belgian
firm. The defendant-appellant argued that the action brought by the
Government of Russia was not recognized by the Belgian Government.
The Court of Appeals of Liege decided the case in favor of the defendant-appellant, holding:
A foreign State has access to the Belgian Courts only if its
Government has been officially recognized by the Belgian
Government. It is a principle of public law that the power
to grant recognition to another State belongs solely to the
Executive. The Courts can do no more than state the situation 7created by the action of the Government of their coun8
try.

The Belgian Government had not recognized the Soviet Government. According to an earlier Belgian decision by the Court of Cassation of March 3, 1930, a refusal on the part of the executive to recognize
a foreign Government was tantamount to a denial of any juridical
capacity to that Government.8
In Cibrariov. Russian Trade Delegation in Italy,9 an appeal from
an Italian appellate court, defendant Cibrario argued that the Soviet
Government had not been promptly recognized by the Italian Government, and therefore, it should not have been allowed access to the
courts in Italy. However, the defendant's statement was contrary to
the obvious fact that the Italian Government had actually accorded
official recognition to the Soviet Government before the initiation of
the claims against defendant Cibrario. It was because of Italy's de
jure recognition of Russia, through the Italo-Soviet Treaty of February

84. Id. at 56. At the time of the acquisition of the property which was the object of the
suit, Sweden was maintaining de facto relations with, but had not recognized, the Soviet Government, and the acquisition was made with pending permission of the Swedish Government.
But protection of the property was refused simply on the ground of non-recognition. Id. at 54-55.
85. Id. at 56.
86. 6 Ann. Dig. 57 (1931-1932), Case No. 28, 26 J.A.I.L. Supp. 505 (1932).
87. 6 Ann. Dig. 57 at 57-58.
88. Id. at 58.
89. 6 Ann. Dig. 54 (1931-1932), Case No. 26.
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24, 1924, that the Italian Court of Cassation affirmed the Genoa Court
of Appeal's decision to allow the Soviet Government's Trade Delegation
in Rome to sue in Italian courts. They were allowed to sue for the
recovery of money against defendant Cibrario who, before fleeing to
Italy and depositing some of the money below, had succeeded in getting
the National City Bank of New York to hand over to him $900,000,
which belonged to the Cinematograph Committee (Department) of the
Soviet Commissariat of Public Instruction. This money was deposited
in New York so that defendant Cibrario could purchase films as a
buying agent.9
C.

Special Cases Relating to China

Under similar circumstances, during and shortly after the Great
Revolution had taken place in China in the 1920s, which once resulted
in confrontation between the North and the South Chinese Governments, the newly born National Government in Nanjing (Nanking)
faced the problem of recognition by other States. In Republic of China
v. Merchants' Fire Assurance Corp., 91 an action was commenced by
a Government department of the Republic of China in the United
States Court for China - the Court sitting in China exercising exterritorial jurisdiction - to recover from the defendant insurance company for a fire loss suffered at Wuchang. After this loss, Wuchang
was seized by the forces of the National Government which took and
held the property involved and the policy covering it. The action was
brought by the National Government of China in the name of the
Republic of China. The National Government was in control of the
greater part of China at that time but had not been duly recognized
by the United States. The action was therefore dismissed in the lower
court on the ground that the National Government of China, not recognized by the United States, had no capacity to sue. In the course
of appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, recognition was extended to the National Government, and the judgment was accordingly
reversed.92
90. Id. For background information, see also Cibrario, 198 App. Div. (N.Y.) at 869, 191
N.Y.S. at 543.
For other cases concerning the Soviet Government, see infra notes 117-23, 133, 147-61 and
accompaning texts.
91. 30 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1929), reprinted in 5 Ann. Dig. 42 (1929-1930), Case No. 21.
92. Subsequent to the above judgment, the United States concluded a treaty of commerce
with the National Government and received a diplomatic representative thereof. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the lower court's ruling was correct on the case as it
stood at that time, since an unrecognized foreign government could not sue in the courts of the
United States. But the conclusion of a treaty and the reception of a diplomatic representative
afforded clear evidence of subsequent recognition of the National Government by the Executive
Department of the United States Government. Id.
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After the founding of the People's Republic of China and before
the normalization of Sino-American diplomatic relationships, American
courts, based on the then non-recognition policy of the Government
of the United States, had refused claims made by the Government of
China or its organs. In Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union
Trust Co.,93 the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California ruled that "in so far as concerned the claim of the East
China Financial and Economic Affairs Administration which, in effect,
was a claim put forward by a Government not recognized by the
United States, the action must be dismissed, a non-recognized government not being entitled to institute proceedings. "- For similar reasons,
the representatives of the People's Republic of China were not allowed
to appear in American courts in Republic of China v. American Express Co.D.

Recent Decisions

There have been fewer cases in recent years involving the question
of recognition of Governments, and the structure of international relations has undergone frequent and fundamental changes, but the rule
remains unaffected that a non-recognized Government has no standing
in the courts of the non-recognizing State. Research reveals that the
majority of recent cases adhere to this established basic rule, and few
real exceptions, if any, have been found to support those arguing that
a non-recognized Government or self-alleged Government has standing
to sue in the courts of the non-recognizing State.
A good recent illustration is Varga v. Cr~dit-Suisse,9 in which an
action was brought by Bela Varga, former President of the Republic
of Hungary, to compel the defendant Swiss bank to account for funds
which had been placed in a safe box in the defendant bank. It was
alleged that in 1949 the bank withdrew these funds and wrongly turned
them over to the Hungarian People's Republic, which had displaced
the former National Hungarian Government. The plaintiff brought this

93. 92 F. Supp. 920 (N.D. Cal. 1950), reprintedin 17 INT'L L. REP. 61 (1952), Case No. 17.
94. Id. According to the Court, one of the accepted consequences is that a non-recognized
government cannot be recognized by the court as a litigant, 92 F. Supp. at 923, citing Guaranty
Trust Co. v. United States, 34 UT.S. 126, 137 (l938).
95. 195 F.2d 230, 234-35 (2d Cir. 1952), reprinted in 19 INT'L L. REP. 192, 194-95 (1952),
Case No. 38. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that "the alleged adverse
claimants, being representative of an unrecognized foreign government, had no standing to sue
and consequently, as a matter of law, could not be adverse claimants for the purpose of allowing
interpleader.
96. 6 Misc. 2d 843 (1957), 162 N.Y.S.2d 80, 5 App. Div. 2d 289 (1958), affd per curiam,
5 N.Y.2d 865, 15 N.E.2d 865, 171 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1958), digested in 26 INT'L REP. 70 (1958-II).
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action in his representative capacity as President of the Hungarian
National Government-in-Exile. On the defendant's motion to dismiss,
the Supreme Court of New York held that the motion should be
denied. According to this lower court's decision, the plaintiff lacked
capacity to sue "as President of the National Hungarian Government"
in view of the fact that the United States recognized the Hungarian
People's Republic as the lawful Government of Hungary. He could,
however, maintain the action in his personal capacity.The lower court's decision was correct in part in the sense that it
adhered to the established principle that a non-recognized Government
may not sue as a plaintiff in the courts of a non-recognizing State.
But, at the same time, the Supreme Court of New York made an
error by allowing the plaintiff, in his personal name, to claim title to
Hungarian State property. Since the above-mentioned funds were public property belonging to the State of Hungary rather than to the
plaintiff as an individual, the latter was not entitled to claim rights
to these funds even in his individual capacity.
Hence, on appeal, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York reversed the order of the lower court, holding that as the
United States did not recognize the group represented by the plaintiff
as the Government of Hungary, he could not sue in the name of the
Hungarian Government. Neither could the plaintiff sue in his personal
capacity as he had no claim in his own right to the fund. The Appellate
Division stated:
The plaintiff is not a sovereign power and may not sue as
such because the group which plaintiff claims to represent
is not recognized by the State Department ....
Likewise,
plaintiff Bela Varga may not sue as an individual because,
concededly, as such, he had no right to the fund claimed.98
A more recent case is Dade Drydock Corp. v. The MIT Mar
Caibe.99 In December 1960 and January 1961, the ship Mar Caribe
was attached as a result of several libels filed by various parties
alleging that sums were due to them for repairs and other reasons.
A Cuban bank alleged that it was a credit instrument of the Cuban
Government, and the Cuban Government intervened as claimants and
filed suits. The bank claimed that as mortgagee it was entitled to
possession of the boat since the mortgage was in default. The Cuban
Government contended that the Cuban bank owned the ship, and that

97.
98.
99.

162 N.Y.S.2d at 82-83, 26 IN'L L. REP. at 70.
171 N.Y.S.2d at 676, 26 INTL L. REP. at 71.
199 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Tex. 1961), reprinted in 32 INT'L L. REP. 70 (1966).
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under the principles of sovereign immunity, the ship could not be
attached. It further claimed that it was entitled to possession because
the ship had been chartered to the Institute Cubano de Petrolio, an
°°
arm of the Government.1
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, believing that the Cuban Government had been derecognized by the United
States, held that actions by the Cuban Government or others acting
on its behalf should be suspended until such time as it was again
recognized by the United States. On January 17, 1961, formal diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba were severed. According to the Court, this severance resulted in "the withdrawal of
diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Cuba." Therefore, the Court
maintained, the plea of sovereign immunity was not available to those
acting on behalf of the Republic of Cuba; and the Cuban Government
or others acting on its behalf did not have powers to bring suit or to
assert rights of possession to the vessel.11
In In re Mitzkel's Estate,1°2 the Surrogate's Court of Kings County
of New York held that the power of attorney of the Lithuanian distributees running to the respondents was invalid. The Lithuanian nationals before the Court were indirectly represented by an agency of
the Soviet Government (Ministry of Justice). The Court refused to
recognize the power of attorney executed by the Lithuanians since
the United States did not recognize the incorporation of Lithuania in
Russia. °3 Also, in In re Kapocius' Estate,'°4 the same court held that
attorneys for the Soviet Embassy could not validly appear before the
Court on behalf of Lithuanian nationals, distributees of an estate, and
that their appearances could not be recognized due to the foreign
policy of the United States against recognition of the incorporation of
Lithuania in Russia.1°s These two cases were correct analogies of the
principle of non-access by the unrecognized. The United States Government's non-recognition of the incorporation of Lithuania in Russia was
tantamount to the non-recognition of Russia as the simultaneous Government of Lithuania.

100. 199 F. Supp. at 872-73, 32 INT'L L. REP. at 70.
101. 199 F. Supp. at 874, 32 INT'L L. REP. at 71. Note, however, that the U.S. Supreme
Court did not hold, in the later case, that the severance of diplomatic relations between the
United States and Cuba resulted in withdrawal of recognition. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 389 (1964). See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying texts.
102. 36 Misc. 2d 671 (1962), 233 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1962), reprinted in 33 INT'L L. REP. 43 (1967).
103. 233 N.Y.S.2d at 525-27, 33 INT'L L. REP. at 44.
104. 36 Misc. 2d 1087, 234 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1962), noted in 33 INT'L L. REP. 43, 46 (1967),
Note to In re Mitzkel's Estate.
105. Id.
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An outstanding recent case is Federal Republic of Germany v.
Elicofon, Kunstsammlugen zu Weimar v. Elicofon'°6 (alternatively,
Kunstsammlugen zu Weimar v. F.R.G.).0 7 In January 1969, when
the German Democratic Republic was still unrecognized by the United
States, the Federal Republic of Germany filed an action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for the
restoration of two valuable paintings then in the possession of a New
York resident named Edward E. Elicofon. These paintings had presumably been removed from the Museum in Weimar in the Eastern
Zone of Germany by American Troops who had occupied Weimar for
a short period of time in 1945.108 In April 1969, the German Democratic

Republic, still regarded by the United States as the Eastern Zone of
Occupation, applied to intervene on behalf of the Weimar Museum
and commenced a separate action against Elicofon, claiming that the
paintings belonged to the Kunstsammulugen zu Weimar as the body
which had not controlled the Museum's art collection.-10 The U.S.
Attorney, acting under the direction of the Attorney-General and on
behalf of the Department of State, filed in the Federal Republic's
action a "suggestion of interest." This indicated to the court that the
United States did not recognize the East German regime and that
instead it recognized the Federal Republic as the only German Government entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German People in international affairs." 0 Given the express attitude of

the executive branch of the U.S. Government and the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York,", on appeal, the
United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals, held that the Government of the German Democratic Republic lacked locus stadi as a
plaintiff. 112
106. 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y 1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1259 (1972), affd, 478 F.2d
231 (1973), reprinted in 61 INT'L L. REP. 143 (1981), 12 I.L.M. 1163 (1973).
107. 478 F.2d 231, cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931, reh'g denied, 415 U.S. 952, reprinted in 13
I.L.M. 117 (1974).
108. 358 F. Supp. at 748-49, 61 INT'L L. REP. at 143.
109. 358 F. Supp. at 749, 61 INT'L L. REP. at 143-44.
110. 358 F. Supp. at 750, 61 INTL L. REP. at 144.
111. 358 F. Supp. at 752, 61 INTL L. REP. at 144-45.
112. 478 F.2d at 232, 61 INT'L L. REP. at 145. According to the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York:
Nonrecognition of a government . . . is indicative of the refusal of the United
States to regard that government as the legitimate spokesman in international
affairs for the people it purports to govern. Nonrecognition, therefore, negatives
the very posture which the German Democratic Republic would necessarily have
to assume had it brought suit for return of the paintings.
358 F. Supp. at 752. It was held that the act of a United States court in permitting an
unrecognized government to sue in the United Sates courts, "in an attempt to vindicate the
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More recently, in the Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc.,113 the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed
a suit brought by the "Republic of Vietnam." The District Court
reasoned that the Republic of Vietnam no longer existed in law or in
fact as a State or as a Government, and that the United States had
not recognized any Government as sovereign authority in the territory
formerly known as South Vietnam. 114 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed this judgment by the following statement:
The law is well established that a foreign government that
is not recognized by the United States may not maintain
suit in state or federal courts. The recognition of foreign
governments is a function of the executive branch and is
wholly outside the competence of the judiciary . . . . On
occasion, suit has been brought by a foreign government
recognized by the United States and during the pendency
of the action, diplomatic recognition of the party plaintiff
has been withdrawn. Under these circumstances, courts have
traditionally responded by either dismissing the action or
suspending it sine die pending recognition of a new govern115
ment by the United States.
It can be seen from the above examination of judicial decisions of
municipal courts that the principle that a non-recognized State or
Government cannot sue in the courts of a non-recognizing State has
become a widely adopted customary rule. It has been generally followed ever since its first enunciation in 1804. The establishment and
application of this rule has been developed through a long, yet progressive and affirmative history, and there are still cases applying it today.
VI.

ANALYSES

OF EXCEPTIONS AND SEEMING EXCEPTIONS TO
THE NON-ACCESS PRINCIPLE

Exceptions often occur to any general phenomenon or to the general
law of any particular matter. Exceptions are merely the non-essentials

private rights of specific citizens or of its citizenry as a whole, would be the equivalent of an
assertion by the court that it acknowledges the right of that government to represent the people
of [that State], and would be inconsistent with presidential denial of recognition." 358 F. Supp.
at 752. The above opinion of the District Court was fully affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in 478 F.2d at 232. See also H. MOSLER, THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
AS A LEGAL COMMUNITY 47 (Sijhoff & Noordhoff 1980).
113. 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977), reprinted in 22 AM. INT'L L. CASES 68.
114. 556 F.2d at 893-94.
115. Id. at 894.
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of the thing. In a sense, "exceptions" per se are but just affirmation
of the main aspects or the major part of the thing. Meanwhile, no
exception is unconditional - exceptions occur only in certain unusual
circumstances. If they were without limitation, "exceptions" then could
be called as such, and they would constitute an entire negation to the
thing as a whole or to the law of the thing, and would thus become
the rules (the essentials) rather than exceptions (the non-essentials).
The fact that a non-recognized State or Government cannot sue in
the courts of the non-recognizing State has unquestionably become a
general rule and is therefore the essential part. Of course, there may
be certain exceptions (or seeming exceptions) to this rule. But these
exceptions are conditional and cannot negate the general rule as the
major part of this particular "thing." In the Guanghua Liao case, the
Japanese courts employed some exceptional or seemingly exceptional
cases to justify their allowing the Taiwanese authorities to appear as
the plaintiff in the action against China's State property. Through the
following surveys and analyses, however, it will not be surprising to
note that none of the exceptions or seeming exceptions share any
common point with the groundless stance held by the GuanghuaLiao
courts, and none is applicable to the present Japanese case. Compared
with the basic principle of non-access which reflects the general and
essential practice and customs of nations, these exceptions merely
reflect the non-essential and exceptional or seemingly exceptional practice. So long as the Japanese case involves no certain justifiable circumstances under which exceptions may be allowed, the general rule
of customary international law, that is, that a non-recognized State
or Government may not sue in the courts of the State refusing recognition, should have been applied.
A.

Early "Exceptions"

One of the early cases seemingly to be exceptional to the general
rule of non-access was The Sapphire.16 In 1867, the French transport
Euryale was damaged in a collision with the Sapphire in the harbor
of San Francisco. Thereupon an action was filed in the American
Courts in the name of Napoleon III. The lower courts gave judgments
for the appellees. But an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of
the United States. Meanwhile, Napoleon III had been deposed. At
the trial before the United States Supreme Court in 1871, the appellant
urged that the deposition of Napoleon III, in whose name the suit

116.

11 Wall. 164 (1871) (Emphasis added).
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had been instituted, had abated the action. The United States Supreme
Court, however, unaminously upheld the right to continue the suit.
The Court delivered the following opinion: "A foreign Sovereign, as
well as any other foreign person, who has a demand of a civil nature
against any person here, may prosecute it in our courts. To deny him
this privilege would manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling.",,,
The Court said that the reigning sovereign represents the national
sovereignty. Sovereignty was continuous and perpetual, and resided
in the proper successors of the sovereign for the time being. Napoleon
III was the owner of the vessel Euryale, not as an individual, but as
the sovereign of France. On his deposition the sovereign did not
change but merely the person or persons in whom it resided. The
State of France was the true and real owner of its public vessels of
war. The reigning emperor, or national assembly or other actual person
or party in power, was but the agent and representative of the national
sovereignty or its rights. A change in the representative of the national
sovereignty worked no change in the rights of the national sovereignty.
A foreign Government recognized as the successor to its predecessor
was therefore entitled to continue in a suit filed by its predecessor. 118
This author carefully checked the sources of this case and found
nothing different from or contrary to the above wording. In fact, this
decision affirmed the non-access rule from a positive angle, rather
than deviate from it, as might have been misunderstood by some. 1 9
The Court in its conclusion did not say that a succeeding unrecognized
Government might continue a suit commenced by the deposed Government. Instead, it used the word recognized in that famous sentence.
"The next successor recognized by our Government is competent to
carry on a suit already commenced and receive the fruit of it. "120 From

this we can see that the United States was not in a position to refuse
to recognize the successor Government to Napoleon III. This did not
involve such a question of recognition or non-recognition of the new
French Government when the deposition took place. A recognized
Government of course had the right to sue, or to carry on a suit
already instituted by its predecessor in the courts of the recognizing
State. It follows that, strictly speaking, this case cannot be said to
be an exception to the general rule of non-access by the unrecognized.

117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 167.
Id. at 167-68.
See, e.g., T. CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 136 (1951).
11 Wall. at 168.
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Another early example was United States v. Insurance Companies
(1874),121 which is deemed to be the first "de facto exception" to the
non-access rule.122 This was a post-Civil War case involving two insurance companies created by the Georgia Legislature when Georgia was
not recognized by the Union. The United States Supreme Court held
that the two companies had standing to sue, reasoning that Georgia
had a de facto existence, if not a de jure existence. The acts of the
Georgia Legislature were given effect because they were "mere ordinary legislation" and touched no political question, and recognizing
the validity of the above legislative acts would not be in conflict with
the United States policy. 1 It must be noted beyond the de facto
situation, however, that the Government of Georgia or its Legislature
was not at all involved as the suitor. The plaintiffs in the first instance
were merely two private companies, who were neither governmental
agencies nor representatives or agents of Georgia's Government. They
were purely commercial and business entities though created by special
acts of the Georgia Legislature.
The material question was whether the Court could give effect to
the acts and statutes of a foreign State which, or the Government of
which, was not recognized by the Government of the country where
the Court sits. According to general state practice, the legislative (and
judicial) activities in a non-recognized State or in a recognized State
with a non-recognizing Government, are not given effect in the courts
of the non-recognizing State (the denial-of-effect rule).1' It is in this
sense that the United States Supreme Court decision in Insurance
Companies formed an exception to the general denial-of-effect rule,
rather than an exception to the "non-access" rule.
True, this exception to the denial-of-effect rule was based in part
on the "de facto existence" of Georgia, but it was also based on the
very nature of "mere ordinary legislation." It was not necessary for
the Supreme Court to deny all the legislative activities in a non-recognized State or a recognized State with a non-recognized Government,
which regulated merely daily social life. There was no indication that
the above two insurance companies mentioned were agents or arms
of the Georgia Government or Legislature. Rather, they were private

121. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 99 (1874).
122. See, e.g., Belthoff, Transportes Aereos des Angola v. Ronair, Inc.: Nonaccess to United
States Courts by Unrecognized Governments - A New Exception?, 8 N.C.J. INTL L. & COM.
REG. 225, 230-32 (1982-1983).
123. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 101, 103-4.
124. See, e.g., J. STARKE, supra note 1, at 142; H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 40, at 137.
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and independent enterprises. Hence, the Insurance Companies decision cannot be said to be a true exception to the general rule of
non-access.
B.

The Wulfsohn Case

Trying to argue that a non-recognized Government might be given
judicial recognition in a non-recognizing State, the Osaka High Court,
in its decision in the Guanghua Liao case, cited Wulfsohn et al. v.
Russian Socialist FederatedSoviet Republic (1923). 1 5 Unfortunately,
as we will see below, the Wulfsohn case did not actually stand by the
side of the Osaka High Court.
Wulfsohn and Company were American importers of furs. On June
25, 1920, a large quantity of their furs, valued at $127,935, was seized
at Yakutsk. Wulfsohn brought an action in the Supreme Court of the
State of New York for conversion and secured an attachment on certain
properties of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic which
were within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Appellate Division of
the New York State Supreme Court, prior to this case, had held that
the Soviet Government could not sue in a United States court. 126 By
analogy, the defendant reasoned that it could not be sued either. It
also argued that it could not be sued because it was a foreign sovereign
and was immune from suit. The Supreme Court, allowing the recovery
against the Soviet Republic as a public corporation, held that the
immunity of a foreign Government from process was not based upon
any absolute right by virtue of its sovereignty, but by international
comity. In the absence of any international comity between the United
States and the Soviet Republic, the latter had no valid claim to immunity. The inability to sue did not create any immunity from suit. 127 On
appeal, the Appellate Division of the second department of the New
York Supreme Court affirmed the above judgment, holding that the
Soviet Republic, being unrecognized and unacknowledged was "not
entitled to the immunities accorded to recognized governments," and
that the Soviet Republic was "a foreign corporation aggregate" and
was liable to suit.12

125. 202 App. Div. (N.Y.) 421 (1922), 234 N.Y. 372 (1923), rev'd, 235 N.Y. 579 (1923), 266
U.S. 580 (1924), reprinted in 2 Ann. Dig. 39 (1923-1924), Case No. 16.
126. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 198 App. Div. 869 (1921),
affd, 235 N.Y. 255 (1923), reprinted in 2 Ann. Dig. 41 (1923-1924), Case No. 17; see supra note
76 and accompanying text.
127. 202 App. Div. (N.Y.) at 421-23.
128. Id. at 424-25.
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On further appeal, however, the Court of Appeals of New York
reversed the order of attachment and granted the motion to vacate
the judgments and to dismiss the complaint. Judge Andrews wrote
the opinion that a de facto Government was immune from suit regardless of recognition because immunity did not rest upon comity but
upon fundamental considerations of international relations. According
to the court:
[Plaintiffs] may not bring a foreign sovereign before our bar,
not because of comity, but because he has not submitted
himself to our laws. Without his consent he is not subject
to them. Concededly that is so as to a foreign government
that has received recognition ....
But, whether recognized
or not, the evil of such an attempt would be the same. "To
cite a foreign potentate into a municipal court for any complaint against him in a public capacity is contrary to the law
of nations and an insult which he is entitled to resent." In
either case to do so would "vex the peace of nations." In
either case the hands of the State Department would be

tied. 129
It must be pointed out here that this case shares no similarity
with the Guanghua Liao case. First of all, there occurred no question
of appearance by a non-recognized Government as the plaintiff in the
courts of the non-recognizing State in the Wulfsohn case. The Soviet
Government, though still unrecognized by the United States at that
time, did not appear as the plaintiff, but as the defendant claiming
immunity from suit. Moreover, the New York highest Court's cognizance of the de facto Soviet Government was based on its actual and
effective ruling and governance over the whole country of Russia.
Even the plaintiff acknowledged that the de facto character of the
Soviet Republic was in fact a matter of common knowledge. 3 0 The
Court's judgment upon the Soviet status was actually not in conflict
with the non-recognition policy of the Government of the United
States. To the contrary, the Court took some elements of international
relations into proper consideration. 13 Though, theoretically speaking,
a non-recognized State or Government as a consequence of non-recog-

129.
130.

234 N.Y. at 376 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 374.

131. The Court held that the question was a political one, not confined to the courts but
to another department of government. Whenever an act done by a sovereign in his sovereign
character was questioned it became a matter of negotiation, or of reprisals or of war. Id. at
376. See also infra note 133.
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nition is not entitled to claim immunity from judicial process in a
non-recognizing State,'3 2 it is in fact impracticable to compel such a
non-recognized de facto State or Government to accept the court's
jurisdiction. In Wulfsohn, the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York not only saw the unreality of bringing a foreign sovereign before
the bar, but also considered the possible consequences of doing so. Hence, the Wulfsohn Court's decision in essence was in conformity
with the foreign policy of the U.S. Government. The nature of
Wulfsohn is obviously different from that of the GuanghuaLiao case
where the Japanese courts, by recognizing the defunct "Republic of
China" as a "de facto Government" and accepting that illegal regime's
illegal institution of actions against China's State property, went
against the international responsibility the Japanese Government had
assumed. It is really meaningless for the Japanese courts to have cited
the Wulfsohn case.
C.

The Fernandez Case

In giving its opinion on the Guanghua Liao case, the Osaka High
Court emphatically invoked one American case, Mexico v. Fernandez. - This effort was commented upon and was pointed out to be
helpless in the Japanese courts.135 As the Fernandez case is unknown
to most, it is necessary here to go through the basic facts before
giving a proper analysis. Plaintiff M.V. Fernandez was an employee
in the Mexican treasury until February 1923 when he fled with 140,000
pesos which he placed in a locked box in the National Bank of
Haverhill, Massachusetts. An attorney appeared in the name of "the
Government of Mexico" and obtained a temporary restraining order
from a Massachusetts local judge forbidding removal of the contents
of this box. During the proceedings in May 1923, before the Superior
Court of Essex County, the assistant district attorney presented the
following communication to the Attorney General of the United States
from the Undersecretary and Acting Secretary of State Phillip:
T

132. See, e.g., J. STARKE, supra note 1, at 142.
133. 234 N.Y. at 376. The Court also said:
[The Soviet Government] was being sued for an exercise of authority within its
own jurisdiction. If the Court of Appeals had insisted upon making recognition the
condition of immunity, the Court would have blundered into the very sort of
political question which it is the rule in regard to recognition to avoid.
Id. See also supra note 128 and accompanying text.
134. An unreported case, cited & discussed in Wright, Suits Brought by Foreign States
with Unrecognized Government, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 742, 743-46 (1923).
135. See Zhu, supra note 12.
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The Government of the United States has not accorded recognition to the administration now functioning in Mexico,
and therefore has at present no official relations with that
administration. This fact, however, does not affect the recognition of the Mexican State itself, which for years has
been recognized by the United States as an "international
person," as that term is understood in international practice.
The existing situation simply is that there is no official intercourse between the two States." The attorney for the plaintiff then moved to amend' the charge so as to read "the
United States of Mexico.1 36

The defendant argued that the attorney did not have the right to
appear for the plaintiff, because his authority was derived from a
Government not recognized by the United States. The Superior
Court
1
of Essex County, however, continued the restraining order. 37
Far from being a ground for the Japanese courts to accept law
suits illegally brought by the unrecognized and self-claimed "Republic
of China" against the State property belonging to the People's Republic
of China, Mexico v. Fernandez was a long distance from the present
Guanghua Liao case.
First, although the United States had not recognized the Obregon
Government, it did recognize the State of Mexico as an "international
person." The plaintiff in Mexico v. Fernandez changed its designation
during the litigation, and appeared thereafter in the name of the
1
United States of Mexico.

8

Second, in Mexico v. Fernandez, no rival Government of Mexico
was recognized by the United States. The Obregon Government was
the only Government ruling in Mexico at that time. It was in effective
control of the whole Mexican country.

39

No other party or entity other

than the Obregon r~gime claimed itself to be the Mexican Government,
not to mention any "effective control." As the sole de facto and effective
Government in Mexico, the Obregon regime undoubtedly was entitled
to represent the recognized State as a whole.
Third, the Obregon Government maintained agents in many American cities who, though lacking exequaturs, performed the usual functions of consuls for Mexico; it had a charg6 d'affaires at the Mexican

136.
137.
138.
139.

17 AM. J. INT'L L. at 743.
Id.
Id. at 744.
Id.
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Embassy building in Washington, D.C., who, though not officially
0
received by the Department of State, actually represented Mexico. 14
Fourth, it was evidenced that the United States was in pending
negotiations with unofficial representatives of the Obregon Government and this might soon result in the United States Government's
recognition of the Obregon Government,14 1 which would be retroactive
42
to a time prior to the initiation of this case.1
Fifth, if the Superior Court had refused the Mexican Government
the opportunity to seek protection for the state money, the State of
Mexico would, undoubtedly, have sustained a serious loss.'" This situation simply does not exist in the Guanghua Liao case.
Sixth, the Fernandez Court was merely maintaining a local judge's
temporary order forbidding removal of the money, and the continuance
of the restraining order did not involve immediate passage of Mexican
property to the Obregon Government. Such action might well be deferred until a Government was actually recognized by the United
States.'"
Seventh, the U.S. State Department's communication disclosed no
national policy which would be affected by judicial assistance in the
protection of the property of Mexico; in fact it strongly intimated that
Mexico, as an "international person," was entitled to such protection. 145
There are occasions where a State exists and is recognized yet there
is no Government recognized as competent to represent it in other
States. 146 Under such circumstances, it is justifiable to allow the actual
and non-controversial foreign Government, even though not officially
recognized as such, to represent its country to claim rights in the
courts of other States.
As a matter of fact, all the above was in implied recognition of
the Obregon Government of Mexico. Considering such background,
the Fernandez Court had sufficient reasons to permit the attorneys
to appear in the name of the United States of Mexico, a recognized
"international person," to seek judicial assistance in protecting
Mexico's State property.

140. Id.
141. Three months later, in May 1923, the United States officially recognized the Obregon
Government. Id. at 744.
142. Id. at 743-45.
143. Id. at 745.
144. Id. at 745-46.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 743.
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Lastly and arguably, Mexico v. Fernandez, being merely a local
decision of minor importance from a county court, is not a typical
exception. It was neither reported, nor authoritative. It had less significance and has been seldom cited. It does not reflect or represent
the general practice in American courts. One might wonder how such
an atypical and non-authoritative case, which itself does not support
the positions of the Japanese courts, could be cited as an authority
for supporting the Japanese courts' acceptance of the Taiwanese authorities' illegal claims.
D.

"Exceptions" Relating to the de facto Soviet Union

There were certain cases in which the courts, due to the de facto
and effective nature of the Soviet regime, either treated that regime
as de facto and even the sole Government in Russia, or allowed suits
brought by the Soviet Government or by corporate entities having
ties with the Soviet Government, although the courts' Government
had not accorded official recognition to Russia. One of these cases was
Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States,147 an appeal from a judgment
of the United States Customs Court refusing re-appraisement after
anti-dumping duties had been assessed by the United States on the
plaintiffs imports from Russia. The United States Government moved
to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the importer was an agency
of the Soviet Government, and inasmuch as the Government of the
United States had not recognized the Soviet Government, its agents
and representatives had no right to appear in any of the courts of the
United States as a party to any litigation therein. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) dismissed the motion, and allowed
the plaintiff to claim its rights, reasoning that although the trading
corporation was under the control of the Soviet Government, it was
a citizen of the State of New York, with the right to sue and be sued
in the courts of the United States. "When a government becomes a
stockholder in a corporation, it does not exercise its sovereignty as
48
such."1
It should be emphasized here that the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals looked at the plaintiff as an American citizen-corporation, not
as an agent or instrumentality of Russia. As a commercial entity which
made its registration in the State of New York, the corporation naturally had judicial capacity before American courts. There seemed to be

147.

71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1933), reprinted in 7 Ann. Dig. 75 (1933-1934), Case No. 30.

148.

7 Ann. Dig. at 75-6.
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no deviation in Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States from the general non-access rule. Just to the contrary, the CCPA intended to avoid
a departure from the non-access rule by regarding the plaintiff as an
American corporate person rather than as an arm of the Soviet Government.
Another case was Union of Soviet Socialist Republics v. Luxemborg & Saar Co.,1 49 which involved an ordinary commercial action
brought before the Commercial Tribunal of Luxembourg by the Soviet
Trade Delegation in Paris for the price of goods sold and delivered
to the defendant company. The defendant pleaded that as the Soviet
Government had not been recognized by Luxembourg, the plaintiff
had no standing in the Luxembourg courts. The plea of the defendant
was rejected and the Soviet Government was allowed access to the
Court. 150
At first sight, Luxembourg & Saar seems to be an exception to
the general rule of non-access. It may give one a false impression, as
if a non-recognized Government may also, as a recognized Government
may, invoke the courts of a foreign non-recognizing State. But, inferring from the reasoning of the judgment, one can discover that the
non-access rule was well upheld and affirmed in a sense. In international theory and practice, there can be more than one mode of recognition, including explicit recognition and implicit recognition. The
Luxembourg & Saar Court found that the Union of Soviet Socialists
Republics was admitted into the League of Nations, of which Luxembourg was also a member; and this implied "the recognition by Luxembourg of the Soviet Government, the only lawful authorities in that
State. '' 151 It was obvious that the Tribunal's decision allowing access
was based on the fact of implied recognition of the Soviet Union by
the Luxembourg Government; in this sense, the Luxembourg & Saar
decision cannot be said to be a departure from the non-access rule.
Moreover, the Soviet Government was the only one representing
the State of Russia, and exercising solid and effective control and
ruling over the whole Russian territory. It had been and was continuingly being recognized as such by the majority of Western Powers
and other countries. However, by the time the case was decided,
Luxembourg had not officially declared its recognition of the Soviet
Government, and it did not recognize any such other regime as might
allege to be the representative of Russia. In fact, there was no such

149. 32 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INT'L 489 (1937), reprinted in 8 Ann. Dig. 144
(1935-1937), Case No. 33.
150. 8 Ann. Dig. 114.
151. Id. at 114-15.
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regime other than the Soviet Government in existence at that time.
The fact that Russia and Luxembourg could co-stand at the same time
within the same important inter-governmental organization - the
League of Nations - explains that the Luxembourg Government did
not deny the factual existence of the Soviet Government. Rather, it
indirectly and implicitly recognized that regime.
A third example was a well-known Dutch case, "Exportchleb"Ltd.
v. Goudeket.152 As assignee of the Trade Delegation of Russia at Berlin,
the "Exportchleb" company had unsuccessfully sought leave of the
President of the District Court of Amsterdam to execute an arbitral
award pronounced against the defendant under an arbitration clause
in a contract of sale which the Delegation had concluded with the
defendant. After the refusal of the President to grant leave to execute
the award, the "Exportchleb" brought a fresh action against the defendant in the district court. The defendant disputed the competence of
the Court on the grounds that the contract had been concluded by a
representative of Russia, that the Government of Russia had not been
recognized by Holland, and that, therefore, neither the Russian Government nor the "Exportchleb" as their assignee under the contract
could appear in a Dutch Court. The Court held that the defense should
be rejected because, though non-recognition of the actual Russian
Government by the Netherlands was involved, "non-recognition by no
means entailed the consequence that the de facto Government of the
Russian State was incompetent to appear for Russia in matters of
civil law in the Courts of Holland."1
Really, this decision constitutes a de facto exception to the rule
that a non-recognized State of Government has no standing in the
courts of the non-recognizing State. But there is a prerequisite to this
exception, that is, the unrecognized Government must be "actual." It
must be one which is exercising real, de facto and effective control of
the whole or the major part of the country concerned. By the late
1920s and the early 1930s, it had already become a well-known fact all
over the world that the Soviet Government had proved itself to be
the sole political regime exercising firm, stable and effective governance over the territory of Russia and the people within. Although
military interventions and subversive attempts and activities were
still going on within and without the Russian territory, no force or
power was ever able to subverse and replace the Soviet Government.

152.

1935

WERKBLAD VAN

HET RECHT,

No. 12980, 1935

NEDERLANDISCHE

JURIS-

1058, reprinted in 8 Ann. Dig. 117 (1935-1937), Case No. 36.
8 Ann. Dig. at 118.

PRUDENTIE

153.
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At this time, neither within, nor outside the territory of Russia, did
there exist a second and even self-claimed or self-called "Russian Government" other than the Soviet regime. Due to the stability, effectiveness and the "de facto-ness" of the Soviet Government, Western Powers could not but acknowledge and accept the situation, either
explicitly or implicitly, though such acknowledgement and acceptance
were often rather painful and unwilling. This was strongly evidenced
through the acceptance of Russia into the membership of the League
of Nations in 1929 and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and various countries around that period. The Netherlands and Russia were both members of the League of Nations. This
similarly implied that the Netherlands Government at least implicitly
acknowledged Russia as the de facto Government of Russia. On this
point, "Exportchleb"Ltd. v. Goudeket had a different background from
those in several earlier cases concerning the procedural rights of the
Soviet Republic in other countries back in the 1920s.'In addition, what was involved in "Exportchleb" Ltd. v. Goudeket
was purely a civil litigation. The participant was not the Soviet Government itself, but merely an assignee of the Soviet Trade Delegation,
which per se functions commercially. This case was among those invoked by the Japanese courts as additional "authorities" for their
wrong decision in the Guanghua Liao case. Unfortunately, they chose
inappropriate cases and found incorrect authorities. There simply do
not exist such "authorities" supporting the illegal actions brought by
the so-called "Republic of China."
Also among those cases cited by the Japanese courts in the Guanghua Liao rulings were Banque de Francev. Equitable Trust Co. and
Same v. Chase National Bank of New York.'r These were actions
against the defendant banks for recovery of gold valued at $2,600,000.
The plaintiff had bought large quantities of gold in Russia before July
1917 which it entrusted to the State Bank of the Russian Empire at
Petrograd to be delivered upon demand. After the Revolution of
November, 1917, this gold was confiscated or taken over by the State
Bank of Russia. France had recognized the Soviet Government in 1924
but the United States had not. A German firm sent a quantity of bar
gold to the defendants on order and for account of the State Bank of
Russia. This was the gold which the plaintiff sought to recover.1 5The
defendants contended that: 1) the gold was not the plaintiffs property
but that of the State Bank of Russia; 2) if the gold in question were

154.
155.
156.

See supra notes 68-90 and accompanying texts.
33 F.2d 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), digested in 5 Ann. Dig. 43 (1929-30), Case No. 22.
Id.
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the gold confiscated by the Soviet Government, that Government had
been recognized by France with the effect of validating the confiscation; 3) all claims of nationals of France against Russia were to be
the exclusive subject of negotiation between that two Governments;
4) the gold was immune from process; 5) determination of this action
would necessitate examination of the acts and decrees of the Government of Russia concerning property in Russia at the time of making
and enforcing such decrees; and 6) in view of the recognition of Russia
by France, recovery in this suit by Banque de France would subject
57
the defendants to the possibility of double recovery. 1
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied the plaintiffs motion to strike the above defenses. It
ruled that although the Soviet decrees of confiscation might not be
given effect in the United States, the Soviet Government or its State
Bank might be recognized as the owner of the gold. The court stated:
That there is an existing government in Russian Sovereign
within its own territory cannot be and is not entirely ignored
even by our own country, although it has not recognized
such government .... The refusal of the political department
to recognize a government should not be allowed to affect
private rights which may depend upon proving the existing
conditions in such state . . . . Justice requires that effect
should be given by our courts, even though we do not recognize the Russian Government, to those acts in Russia upon
which the rights of our citizens depend, provided that in so
doing our judicial department does not encroach upon or
interfere with the political branch of our government.'5
With reference to the second defense, since no proof was offered
as to the French law on the effect of subsequent recognition, the court
followed its own rule that recognition of a foreign Government, either
de jure or de facto, validated all acts of such foreign Government from
the time it existed. 15 9 In reference to the third defense, the court
upheld the contention that the claim should be settled between France
and Russia. 160 As to the remaining defenses, the court concluded that
the property of the State Bank should be held immune from process
notwithstanding non-recognition.161

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

45

Florida Journal of
International Law, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 5
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5

The U.S. District Court's judgment per se is self-elucidating. No
issue of procedural rights was involved here, and it can not be said
that this case constituted an exception to the general rule of non-access. The United States did not ignore, at least not entirely, the de
facto existence of the Soviet Government around the 1930s. If not in
deviation from the foreign policy of the nation, it was reasonable for
the Banque de FranceCourt to give effect to certain acts of a non-recognized Government, especially those acts affecting or concerning the
private rights of foreign nationals.!
E.

The Monta Case

In rendering its decision in the Guanhua Liao case, the Osaka
High Court also cited some cases where the status of Taiwan was
involved in a foreign court after that foreign Government had recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China. The court
also cited cases in which certain laws and acts of the People's Republic
of China were given effect in Japanese courts, while Japan did not
yet recognize the Government of the People's Republic of China.162
The leading and most confusing case is Monta of Genoa v. Cechofracht
Co.,163 in which the defendants, a Czechoslovakian company, chartered
the steamship Marilu, belonging to the plaintiff, an Italian company.
The charter party, governed by English law, incorporated the
Chamber of Shipping War Risks clauses (1) and (2). Clause (2) provided:
The ship shall have liberty to comply with any orders or
directions... given by the Government of the nations under
whose flag the vessel sails, ... or by any other Government,
• . . and if by reason of and in compliance with any such
orders or directions anything is done or is not done, the
same shall not be deemed variation, and delivery in accordance with such orders or directions shall be a fulfillment of
the contract voyage and the freight shall be payable accordingly. 6
On July 31, 1953, the Marilu, after duly loading a cargo in North
China, was bound for Singapore sailing under the Italian flag. Near
Ockou Island, some 800 miles north of Quemoy, she was intercepted
by a warship flying the Kuomintang colors and escorted by the armed

162.
163.
164.

See Zhu, supra note 12. A list of these cited cases is unknown to the author at this time.
[1956] 2 Q.B. 552, reprinted in 23 I.L.R. 71 (1956).
23 I.L.R. at 71-72.
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warship to Keelung, where her cargo was discharged on the order of
a general. In accordance with the charter party, fifty percent of the
freight had been paid shortly after the signing of the bills of lading,
and the shipowner claimed to be entitled to the other moiety of the
freight. The charterers disputed the claim and the matter was referred
to an Umpire in London.- Prior to the hearing, there were before
the Umpire communications from the Foreign Office to the effect that
(i) Her Majesty's Government had at all material times ceased to
recognize the former Nationalist Government of China as being the
de jure or de facto Government of the Republic of China, and (ii) Her
Majesty's Government did not recognize that any Government was
located in Taiwan in July and August 1953. The Italian Government
at all material times recognized those carrying on the administration
of, and in fact governing, Taiwan as the de jure Government of
China.'- Notwithstanding the above communications from the Foreign
Office, the Umpire, and subsequently the Queen's Bench Division of
the High Court of Justice, held that the shipowner was entitled to
the sum claimed. The authorities in Taiwan were mistakenly held to
be a "Government" in the sense of the clause of the charter party,
and it was wrongly stated that the master in complying with the
orders given to him to proceed and discharge his cargo at Keelung,
was complying with the orders of a "Government.' '16 7 The Queen's
Bench Division held that the statement from the British Foreign Office
was not conclusive because the charter party, which was to be construed as an ordinary commercial document, did not contemplate that
the body giving orders or directions should necessarily be recognized
as a Government by Her Majesty's Government, and "there was no
rule of law which restricted the evidence to be considered to that
provided by the Foreign Office."'It should be pointed out that Monta of Genoa is in no way applicable
to the Guanghua Liao case. First, the decision of the Queen's Bench
in Monta of Genoa was not typical and representative, as it was not
in keeping with the general practice of English courts in cases where
unrecognized or derecognized Governments were involved. The above
English decision was not decisive, and the Monta rule per se is subject
to criticism. Second, the Monta case and its subject matter had nothing
to do with the People's Republic of China, contrary to the Guanghua

165. Id. at 71.
166. Id. at 72.
167. Id. at 73.
168. Id.
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Liao case where China's State property was directly involved. Third,
in Monta, the English Queen's Bench could not only refer to the
opinion and policy of the British Government, but it could also consult
the position of the Italian Government. However, in the Guanghua
Liao case, the only thing that the Japanese courts could have looked
to was the Japanese Government's foreign policy and its treaty undertakings. Fourth, from the charter party and the British Foreign Office's
communications we see no indication that the body giving orders or
directions should have to be recognized as a Government by the British
Government, nor do we see that the communication was conclusive
so as to exclude other evidence. Rather, the Foreign Office implicitly
directed the Court to other evidence by referring to the Italian position. This implied that the British Government did not care whether
the Court would look to the British Government's position or that
held by the Italian Government. Fifth, Monta posed no question of
procedural rights of a non-recognized Government in foreign courts.
In the Guanghua Liao case, the primary legal issue is whether the
Taiwanese authorities could maintain claims in Japanese courts on
behalf of the so-called "Republic of China" not recognized as such by
the Japanese Government. Last and most importantly, the British
were under no treaty obligation to recognize the People's Republic of
China. Its recognition in the early 1950s was purely a unilateral act
on its own side, and that act, technically speaking, had nothing to do
with the Chinese Government until a formal agreement was reached
twenty-two years later.169 However, in the Guanghua Liao case, no
one could deny that the Japanese Government had undertaken to
recognize the Government of the People's Republic of China as the
only lawful Government of China by signing the Joint Communiqu6
in 1972 and the Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978 with China.
Overall, being totally different from the Guanghua Liao case in terms
of background and specific circumstances, and not reflecting general
international practice, cases like Monta are not to be invoked by the
Japanese courts.

169. The Sino-British Joint Communiqu6 on upgrading mutual diplomatic relations was
signed on March 13, 1972 in Beijing. See People's Daily, Mar. 14, 1972, at 1 (Domestic Ed.);
see also Great Britain and China Sign Agreement Raising Their Diplomatic Contacts to AmbassadorLevel: Great Britain, In Doing So, Acknowledges that Taiwan is a Province of Communist China and Recognizes Communist Government as Sole Legal Government of China,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
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Recent "Exceptions"

1. The Upright Exception
Perhaps, one of the leading recent "exceptional" cases was Upright
v. Mercury Business Machines Co. 170 This involved an action brought
by the assignee of a trade acceptance drawn on and accepted by the
defendant in payment for certain typewriters. These products were
sold and delivered to the defendant by a corporation belonging to the
Government of the Democratic German Republic. The defendant contended that the corporation was an arm of the East German Government and neither the Government (or the corporation) nor any assignee
thereof had the capacity to sue. 171 The Special Term of the Supreme
Court of New York State in New York County held that to permit
the action by the plaintiff would enable a non-recognized Government
to thwart the national policy of non-recognition and to obtain funds
which might be used against the national interest of the United
States. 172 On appeal, however, the Appellate Division reversed the
order of the Special Term denying the plaintiffs motion. The Appellate
Division stated that the assignee of a corporation which was the creature of a non-recognized Government had the capacity to sue on the
underlying transaction, unless it could be shown that the transaction
or the assignment violated the national or public policy of the United
States.173 In the Appellate Division's opinion:
[I]t is insufficient for defendant merely to allege the non-recognition of the East German Government and that plaintiffs
assignor was organized by and is an arm and instrumentality
of such an unrecognized East German Government. The lack
of jural status for such Government or its creature corporation is not determinative of whether transactions with it will
be denied enforcement in American
courts, so long as the
74
Government is not the suitor.
According to the Appellate Division, although a Government may be
unrecognized, it may nevertheless have de facto existence since its
acts, such as creating corporations, might affect private rights and

170.

13 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y. S.2d 417 (1961), reprinted in 32 I.L.R. 65, 2 AM. INT'L

L. CASES 343.

171. 213 N.Y.S.2d 417.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 421, 32 I.L.R. at 67 (Emphasis added). As a matter of fact, neither the Government, nor the corporation itself was the plaintiff. Id.
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obligations arising either from activity in or with persons, or corporations within the territory controlled by such de facto Government. As
the Appellate Division found no national policy against trade with
East Germany, and the typewriters were imported openly and passed
regularly through the United States customs, the court recognized
the acts upon which the plaintiffs action rested.175
Though deemed as an exception to the non-access rule,176 the Upright case may in no way be employed to mean that the Japanese
courts' decisions in the Guanghua Liao case are legal and reasonable.
It had already become a well-known and irredeemable fact by the 1960s
that West Germany and East Germany had successively and respectively become two independent States. Neither the Federal Republic
of Germany nor the German Democratic Republic claimed sovereignty
over the whole territory of what was formally known as the single
State or Reich of Germany. In other words, neither of the two German
Governments purported to gain control of the other, and neither
claimed itself to be the sole one ruling and representing the German
nation as a whole. They only claimed sovereignty over the territorial
part under their respective and actual control. The concept of "two
Germanies" or "two German States" was widely accepted in the international community. Later historical development also proves that,
prior to the official German Re-unification in October 1990, there had
been two German States, rather than just one, each having its own
de facto Government recognized by the majority members of the international community. Under such circumstances, notwithstanding the
non-recognition policy of the United States Government toward the
German Democratic Republic, it was acceptable for a United States
court, to a certain extent, to take judicial notice of that Republic, so
long as it did not affect the United States foreign policy and its national
interests in doing so.
However, in the Guanghua Liao case the difference is substantial.
There has been, is and will always be but only one China. The founding
of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949 was merely a
change in the form of Government, not in the State. The former
Republic of China as a form of Government became a historical name
with its replacement by the newly established People's Republic of
China. From a legal point of view, there has never been a time in
which the People's Republic of China and the "Republic of China"
co-existed simultaneously, and there will never be such a time. Although the Kuomintang regime continued to use the historical name

175.
176.

213 N.Y.S.2d 417.
See Belthoff, supra note 122, at 230-31.
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of the "Republic of China" since it fled to Taiwan, such an act is
entirely illegal, void and null. As one of China's provinces, Taiwan is
always an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of
China. Even the Taiwanese authorities hold the position that there is
only one China and Taiwan is impartible and non-independable. As
the Japanese Government has recognized the Government of the
People's Republic of China as the only legitimate Government of China
to which Taiwan belongs, the various Japanese governmental departments, including the judicial branch, are under an obligation to refuse
to recognize or "take notice of' any such entity or "Government,"
other than the legitimate Government in Beijing, that claims itself to
represent China. This is a natural logic and is common knowledge in
international law as well.
The Osaka and the Kyoto courts, by deeming the Taiwanese authorities as an "unrecognized de facto Government" and by holding
that the "Republic of China" "has been actually exercising exclusive
control over Taiwan and the surrounding islands and the people
thereon," obviously misconstrued the fact, departed from the Japanese
Government's foreign policy toward China, violated the international
obligations Japan had undertaken under the Joint Communiqu6 and
the Peace and Friendship Treaty, seriously hurt the national feelings
of the Chinese people and Government, and in essence affected the
national interests of Japan itself.
Furthermore, the Guanghua Liao case also substantially differs
from Upright in terms of parties and subject matter of the litigation.
In Upright, the plaintiff was neither the East German Government
itself, nor an instrumentality or a "tool" thereof. It was merely an
American corporate citizen acting as the assignee of an ordinary corporation registered in the German Democratic Republic. The Upright
case was simply an ordinary civil law suit concerning a trade acceptance, and what the plaintiff sought was no more than to recover some
$27,307 for payment of certain typewriters. In the Guanghua Liao
case, however, the plaintiff was the Taiwanese government acting in
the name of the so-called "Republic of China," and the actions involved
State property of the People's Republic of China. Although it is natural
for the U.S. courts to accept a private action brought by its own
citizen, it is totally groundless and unacceptable for the Japanese
courts to tolerate proceedings against China's public State property
initiated by an extinct regime not recognized by the Japanese Government.
2. New "Exceptions"
In two recent American cases, it appears as if the courts' decisions
have created exceptions or "new" exceptions to the general rule of
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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non-access by non-recognized states. Yet, in reading the courts' opinions with due caution, one can find that these two decisions were
made without actually deviating from the general principle. In Banco
National de Cuba v. Sabbatino,177 an instrumentality of the Cuban
Government brought suit against a commodities broker for conversion
of bills of lading and against a receiver for certain injunctive relief.
At the time of the suit, the United States recognized Cuba. However,
diplomatic relations had been severed. The respondents argued that
the severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba should close the courts
of the United States to the Cuban Government.178 The United States
Supreme Court did not agree, and instead stated that "lacking some
definite touchstone for determination, we are constrained to consider
any relationship, short of war, with a recognized sovereign power as
embracing the privilege of resorting to the United States courts."' 179
It was true that comity was associated with the existence of friendly
relations between States, but the privilege of suit had been denied
only to Governments at war with the United States and to those not
recognized by the United States. 180 The Court stated:
Although the severance of diplomatic relations is an overt
act with objective significance in the dealings of sovereign
states, we are unwilling to say that it should inevitably result
in the withdrawal of the privilege of bringing suit .... The
possible incongruity of judicial "recognition," by permitting
suit, of a government not recognized by the Executive is
completely absent where merely diplomatic relations are broken. The view that the existing situation between the United
States and Cuba should not lead to a denial of status to sue
is buttressed by the circumstance that none of the acts of
our Government have been aimed at closing the courts of
this country to Cuba, and more particularly by the fact that
the Government has come to 8support Cuba's "act of state"
claims in this very litigation.1 1
A reading of these opinions does not suggest deviation from the
non-access rule. To the contrary, Sabbatino, from a different angle,
affirmed the general rule that a non-recognized State or Government
has no standing in the courts of a non-recognizing State. It must be

177. 376 U.S. 389 (1964).
178. Id. at 408 & 410.
179. Id. at 410-11.
180. Id. at 409 (citations omitted).
181. Id. at 410-11.
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emphasized here that the severance of diplomatic relations between
the United States and Cuba was essentially different from Japan's
severance of "diplomatic relations" with Taiwan. The United States
Government's decision to break off official contact with Cuba was
based on purely political and ideological considerations, and was a
temporary action rather than a permanent one. Due to the extremely
tense situation existing in the Caribbean area in the late 1950s and
early 1960s, the Cuban missile crisis, and the strained Cuban-American
political relations, the United States and Cuba suspended their mutual
diplomatic contacts. That suspension did not result in, nor from, mutual
withdrawals of recognition. To the United States, the diplomatic severance was not presupposed by establishment of diplomatic relations
with, or recognition of, another Cuban Government. As with the case
in the United States, there was not a second force in Cuba claiming
itself to be the "Cuban Government." According to international practice, a State, once having accorded recognition to a foreign Government, cannot willfully withdraw this recognition. Only when a recognized Government is no longer existent, or only when the State concerned needs to recognize a totally new foreign Government which
displaces the former recognized one by revolutionary or extremely
abnormal means, or only when two States concerned are at war, does
there arise the question of withdrawal of recognition (de-recognition).
It is true that there are definite connections between the establishment of diplomatic relations and recognitions, and connections between
severance of diplomatic relations and withdrawal of recognition. But
there are also distinctions. On the one hand, recognition of a State or82
Government may precede the establishment of diplomatic relations,1
whereas commencement of diplomatic relations necessarily includes or
results in mutual State and Governmental recognitions. On the other
hand, suspension or severance of diplomatic relations does not necessarily imply or result in withdrawal of recognition, while withdrawal
of recognition definitely leads to suspension or break-off of official
diplomatic relations. Such official relations simply do not presuppose
recognition.
What substantially distinguishes the severance of official relations
between Japan and Taiwan and that between the United States and
Cuba lies in the fact that Japan's withdrawal of recognition of the
so-called "Republic of China" and its severance of "diplomatic relations"

182. For example, the British Government recognized the Government of the People's
Republic of China in 1950, but it was only twenty-two years later that the two countries finally
established their full diplomatic relations. See supra note 169.
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with Taiwan took place simultaneously. To be more accurate and stricter, the Japanese Government's decision to break off official relations
with Taiwan was an inevitable outcome of its withdrawal of its recognition of the so-called "Republic of China." This withdrawal was,
again, the logical and unavoidable result of its recognition as the sole
legitimate Government of the Government of the People's Republic of
China of which Taiwan is an inalienable territorial part.
In another recent case, Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair,
Inc.,18 Transportes Aereos de Angola (TAAG), a corporation organized
under the laws of Angola and based in Angola, brought suits against
two American corporations, Jet Traders Investment Corporation (Jet
Traders) and Ronair, Inc. (Ronair), for breach of contract in the sale
of a Boeing aircraft. TAAG had entered into a written agreement to
purchase the aircraft from Jet Traders, who then contracted to purchase the plan from Tekair, Ltd. (Tekair). Title was held by the other
defendant, Ronair, Inc., who had contracted to sell the aircraft to
Tekair. Tekair never delivered the aircraft to Jet Traders, leaving
the latter unable to meet its contractual obligations to TAAG. After
the delivery date had passed and TAAG had not received it aircraft,
it tendered written notice to Jet Traders that it was terminating the
contract, and initiated suit against Ronair and Jet Traders. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, basing their motion on a series
of decisions that had refused litigant status to non-recognized Governments and their instrumentalities.184 The United States District Court
for Delaware did not dismiss the complaint by the Angolan plaintiff.
Instead, it dismissed the defendants' motion to remove the plaintiffs
complaint. Thus, the Court allowed the TAAG's action to proceed, and
granted standing to an alleged instrumentality of a non-recognized
Government.
This judgment, according to some, appears to form "a new exception to the general rule of non-access for unrecognized foreign governments."' 11 But, in fact, there is no substantial deviation in the above
judgment from the general rule that a non-recognized State or Government may not sue in the courts of a non-recognizing State. It can
hardly be said that this case formed an exception or a "new exception"
to that rule. Although the United States had not established diplomatic
relations with Angola, the attitude of the U.S. Government indicated
that it, to a certain extent, had shown implicit recognition or acknow-

183.
184.
185.

544 F. Supp. 858 (D.Del. 1982).
Id. at 861.
See Belthoff, supra note 122, at 225 & 234.
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ledgment of the People's Republic of Angola. During the litigation,
the United States Department of State provided the following official
communication:
The United States does not maintain, and has never maintained diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Angola. At the same time, the United States Government has
not discouraged trade between the United States and Angola. The volume of trade between the two countries in 1980
was $638.6 million, making the United States one of Angola's
largest trading partners . . . . In these circumstances, the
Department of State believes that allowing access to U.S.
courts by the Angolan Airline TAAG, a State-owned business
enterprise, for the resolution of a claim arising out of a
purely commercial transaction would be consistent with the
foreign policy interests of the United States.186
This statement functioned as an acknowledgment or recognition of
the Angolan People's Republic by the United States Department of
State. Upon this statement, the U.S. District Court held that "where
the executive branch, either by its actions or words, evinces a definite
desire to remove the impediment to a suit brought by a non-recognized
government, or an instrumentality thereof, that determination necessarily frees this Court from any strictures placed on the exercise of
its jurisprudence," because "the purpose of denying the privilege of
suit to governments not recognized by the executive branch is solely
' ' 87
to give full effect to that branch's sensitive political judgments. 1
The United States Department of Commerce, upon consultation with
the Department of State, had approved the export of Boeing aircrafts
to Angola for TAAG's use by issuing a trade license. This permission
by the U.S. Department of Commerce was considered in itself a grant
of standing to litigate any claim in the U.S. courts as may arise out
of the transaction approved. Moreover, the U.S. Department of State
itself had "unequivocally" stated that allowing TAAG access to the
U.S. courts would not be inconsistent with the U.S. foreign policy. As "the executive branch, through the U.S. Departments of Commerce
and State, has clearly indicated that this suit should be allowed to go
forward," the defendants' motions to dismiss TAAG's claim were of
course denied. 189 Furthermore, even if the U.S. Government had not

186.
187.
188.
189.

544 F. Supp. at 861.
Id. at 863-64.
Id. at 861 & 863.
Id. at 864.
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expressed its position, the U.S. court could still have allowed the
Angolan airlines to proceed with its claim by applying the so-called
"separate juridical entity" exception, because the plaintiff was not the
Angolan Government or a branch thereof, but a juridical entity of the
Ministry of Transportation of the People's Republic of Angola, 19° which,
though wholly owned by the Angolan Government, was "in fact a
discrete and independent entity," and "should not be subsumed within
its parent Government for purposes of this suit."191 The subject matter
of this litigation was a "purely commercial transaction,"' 1 and this
"lends support to the argument that TAAG was sufficiently detached
from the political nature of the Angolan Government."Obviously, the situations in Ronair allowing "exceptions" to the
non-access rule simply do not exist in the GuanghuaLiao case. First,
the relationship between the United States and Angola is fundamentally different from that between Japan and China. The United States
is under no obligation to recognize or to refuse to recognize the Government of Angola, and the question on how to treat the Angolan
Government is completely at the United States Government's discretion, whereas Japan is bound by its international agreements not to
recognize the local Taiwan r6gime as a Chinese "Government." Second,
the United States Government was willing to maintain a certain kind
of relationship with Angola, and in particular in the Ronair case, was
expressly "allowing access to United States courts by the Angolan
Airline TAAG," whereas in the GuanghuaLiao case, there was not a
single piece of evidence showing that the Japanese Government was
telling the Japanese courts to allow the Taiwan authorities to appear
in the courts of Japan in the name of the "Republic of China" in the
interests of Japan's foreign policy. Even if we assume that the
Japanese Government had so indicated, such indication would have
violated Japan's international undertakings and therefore international
law. Third, the suitor in Ronair was not the "unrecognized" Angolan
Government itself, but a mere separate Angolan corporate entity,
while in GuanghuaLiao, the suitor was the local Taiwanese authorities
in the name of the so-called "Republic of China" which had been
derecognized by the Japanese Government. Given such fundamental
differences between the two cases, one has to conclude that, like all
other "exceptional" cases discussed thus far, the Ronairline of "exceptions" to the non-access rule is not applicable to the present situation
in the GuanghuaLiao case either.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 859.
Id. at 863.
Id. at 861.
Belthoff, supra note 122, at 237.
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More recently, in an English case, Gur Corp. v. Trust Bank of
Africa, Ltd. ,19 the standing of a non-recognized State in English courts
was discussed. The government of the "Republic of Ciskei," which
was created by South Africa in furtherance of its apartheid policy,
brought suit before the Queen's Bench for the settlement of a commercial dispute. The Court recognizes that there are two fundamental
principles regarding the status of a non-recognized state or government: 1) that an unrecognized state or government cannot sue in the
non-recognizing state; 195 and 2) that the governmental acts of such a
non-recognized state cannot be recognized.-' Being convinced of the
British Government's non-recognition policy toward the Republic of
Ciskei, the Court held that the plaintiff lacked locus standi.1- In the
second instance, the Court of Appeals reversed the Queen's Bench's
decision, holding that the lower court erred in reaching the point of
standing to sue. According to the Court of Appeals, the effect of a
certificate of the British Foreign Office concerning the Republic of
Ciskei was that "Her Majesty's Government recognized the Republic
of South Africa as de jure entitled to exercise governing authority in
the Ciskei, ' 19 8 and accordingly, the Government of the Republic of
Ciskei had standing to sue in the courts of the United Kingdom as a
"subordinate body set up by the Republic of South Africa to act on
its behalf."' - It appears that the English Court of Appeals was not
changing the general rule of non-access, but merely amending a specific
lower court decision by regarding the non-recognized Ciskei as a subordinate unit of the recognized South Africa. In spite of the appellate
court's reasoning, it is vulnerable to criticism. An English author
specifically commented that "there is no reason why even the one
. . . step of permitting such a homeland to sue in the British courts
2
should be taken."

194. [1986] 3 W.L.R. 583.
195. Citing, e.g., City of Berne v. Bank of England, 9 Vessey Jr. 347, 32 Eng. Rep. 636
(1804), discussed in supra notes 57-59 and accompanying texts.
196. Citing, e.g., Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 1 K.B. 456. One exception to this denial-of-effect
rule is that, where the family or property rights of individuals are directly affected, the governmental acts of the non-recognized may be given effect by the non-recognizing courts, see
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd., [1967] A.C. 853, 954.'See also supra notes 121-22
& 153-59 and accompanying texts.
197. [1986] 3 W.L.R. 583.
198. Id. at 604.
199. Id.
200. Beck, A South African Homeland Appears in the English Courts: Legitimation of the
Illegitimate?, 36 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 350, at 362. See also Mann, supra note 46.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

57

Florida Journal of
International
Law, Vol. 5,
Iss.JOURNAL
3 [1990], Art. 5
FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL
LAW
VII.

A.

(Vol. 5

OTHER LEGAL ISSUES

People's Republic of China's Succession to the Property in
Question

It is without question that the Guanghua Liao building concerned
is China's State public property purchased with the public money
acquired from the sale of spoils that the Japanese army plundered
from the Chinese people during the Second World War.201 It has been
managed and used by the resident students from China since the War
ended,- and has been under effective supervision and administration
of the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo and the Chinese Consulate General
in Osaka since the normalization of the Sino-Japanese relations. The
Chinese Government allocated special funds to renovate the building. m
In international law, when a Government in a certain State is
displaced by a new Government through revolutionary means, the
new Government, as a matter of course, succeeds to all State property
formerly owned by the old Government, within or outside the territory
of the State in question. This is especially so when such new Government receives formal recognition from other States. 204 The former
Chinese nationalist Government, known as the so-called "Republic of
China," was overthrown and became extinct forty years ago with its
replacement by the Government of the People's Republic of China.
The People's Republic of China's Government has received overwhelming recognition from the international community. As it was recognized
by Japan as the only Government of China, it became entitled to
ownership of any property situated in Japan which had belonged to
the former Chinese Kuomintang Government. Therefore, the Japanese
courts' judgments that the Guanghua Liao building belongs to the
so-called "Republic of China" are contrary to the rules and practices
in international law regarding succession and recognition. That build-

201. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
203. See Editorial, Guanghua Liao Wenti de Shizhi shi Shenmo? (What is the Substance
of the Guanghua Liao Issue?), People's Daily, June 4, 1987, at 1 & 4.
204. See H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 40, at 138, where the famous publicist stated:
One of the legal documents of recognition of a new Government is that, by virtue
of being recognized, the new Government becomes entitled to demand and receive
possession of property situate[d] within the jurisdiction of a recognizing State,
which formerly belonged to the preceding Government at the time of is supersession.
See also D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (2d ed. 1970); J. STARKE, supra note 1,
at 142, 324-27; Draft Articles on State Responsibility prepared by the InternationalLaw Com-

mission, arts. 1, 3, 5 & 6, UN ORGA Supp. (No. 10) 49-133, UN Doc. A/35/10.
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ing should unquestionably have been decided to belong to the People's
Republic of China. As far as Japan is concerned, as the Kyoto District
Court stated in the first instance, with the switch of Japan's recognition
of the Chinese Government from the former "Republic of China" to
the People's Republic of China, the right to ownership of the property
in question was transferred to the latter and removed from the

former. 205
The Osaka High Court argued that, since the "Republic of China"
was still exercising control over part of the Chinese territory, it was
appropriate to deem the succession of the Government of the People's
Republic of China to the former Government of the "Republic of China"
as "partial" or "incomplete. '" This argument is rather ludicrous. It
is common knowledge in international law that "partial succession"
occurs only in case of State succession. For example, when part of
the territory of a certain State is formed as the basis of a new State,
this new State succeeds only to those rights and obligations pertaining
to that particular territorial part of the existing State. Or, when a
State is divided into several new States, within each of these new
States, the succession is only partial. In the case of governmental
succession, however, there is no such chance. As was pointed out
earlier, there can only be one Government in a single State. No matter
in what frequency and in what form a State's Government changes,
there should always be one recognized Government, and the new Government's succession to the old one should always be absolutely
"whole" and "complete. ' ' 207 Professor Shoichi Sekino correctly says that
government succession is distinct from state succession. State succession may be divided into complete succession and partial succession
depending on the form of territorial changes. Whereas in the case of
governmental succession, no changes are brought to the identity and
continuity of the State in question within its territory, and therefore,
the question of partial government succession cannot arise as in the
case of state succession.

205. 22 J.A.I.L. at 155-56; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
206. See Lihai, supra note 35; Zhu, supra note 12. The relevant text of the Osaka High
Court opinion was quoted in Sekino, supra note 47.
207. See Lihai, supra note 35; Zhu, supra note 12. The relevant text of the Osaka High
Court opinion was quoted in Sekino, supra note 47. See also K. MAREK, THE IDENTITY AND
CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Geneve, 1954. For treatment of
the issue of ownership at bar, see Hau, supra note 8; Zhou, supra note 8.
208. Sekino, supra note 47.
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Merely an "Ordinary Civil Lawsuit"?

In the present Guanghua Liao case, the Japanese courts have
repeatedly asserted that the case in question involves merely an "ordinary civil lawsuit." In addition, there have been statements on the
Japanese part to the effect that "China interfered with the internal
affairs of Japan," and that "China was making a fuss over a trifling
matter. "m These statements are nothing but an intention to gloss over
the essence of the GuanghuaLiao issue. It is true that Guanghua Liao
is a small dormitory building used as a residence for Chinese students
studying in Japan. Yet it is China's State property purchased with
the "blood and sweat" of the Chinese people. What is reflected from
the proceedings of the case is a rather important and severe political
and legal matter of principle. The case is by no means merely an issue
of ownership to the building itself and is by no means an "ordinary
civilian lawsuit." In essence, it is an issue of whether the Japanese
Government, including the judiciary, strictly adheres to the spirit and
principles of the Joint Communique, the Peace and Friendship Treaty
and other pertinent agreements between China and Japan. It is a
matter of whether the Japanese Government and its courts observe
established principles and practices of international law. The fact that
the Osaka High Court and the Kyoto District Court regarded the
Taiwan authorities as a "Government" and granted procedural status
to that regime to allow it to appear in the name of the so-called
"Republic of China" shows that the courts, in so doing, treated the
plaintiff not as an ordinary civil entity, but as an international person.
To tolerate the Japanese side is to tolerate the creation of "two Chinas"
or "China and one Taiwan." This is of course unacceptable by the
Chinese Government and the Chinese people. It is not the Chinese
side that interferes with Japan's international affairs. Rather, it is the
Japanese courts' attitude and acts that hurt the national integrity and
dignity of the State of China. Therefore, it could not be said that the
Japanese courts decide merely "ordinary" civil disputes, not to mention
the charges that the Chinese reaction was something to "make a fuss
over a trifling matter."
C.

"Sanquan Fenli" or Avoiding Responsibility?

Since the normalization of the Sin-Japanese relations, the Chinese
Government has repeatedly requested the Japanese Government to
help solve the Guanghua Liao issue according to the spirit and princi-

209.

See Editorial, supra note 203.
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ples of the Joint Communiqu6 and other pertinent agreements between
the two countries. Unfortunately, the Japanese Government has been
reluctant to do so. In defending the Japanese courts' decision over
the Guanghua Liao case, the Japanese Government has repeatedly
stated that it upholds the so-called "sanquanfenli" principle, that is,
the principle of "division of powers among three governmental
branches" - the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. It claims
that it is improper and impossible to intervene in the judicial branch,
that it cannot change the courts' judgments, and that it can do nothing
more than to "persistently explain to the Chinese the principle of
'sanquan fenli,"' and so forth. 210 All these are used obviously as a
shield to evade the Japanese Government's responsibility.
It is not strange that in any country where powers are divided
among three branches, it is always the Government (usually the executive) that is responsible for external affairs. This is the case with the
United States and many others, and it is also the case with Japan.
According to Article 93 of the Japanese Constitution, the power to
handle foreign relations rests with the Japanese cabinet. Article 98
provides that "[t]he treaties concluded by Japan and established laws
of nations shall be faithfully observed." Article 99 provides that "[t]he
Emperor or the Regent as well as ministers of State, members of the
Diet, judges and all other public officials have the obligation to respect
and uphold this constitution. '' 211 The Osaka High Court's rulings in the
Guanghua Liao case are not only in breach of international law, particularly of Sino-Japanese treaties, but also in breach of the internal
law of Japan. In the present case involving two States and such important issues as whether or not to observe international agreements and
fulfill international obligations, what organ or branch could the Chinese
Government have contacted other than the Japanese Government
which is responsible for diplomatic affairs? The court's illegal decisions
are State acts, and the State of Japan, as a whole or its Government,
is completely responsible for such acts. As is correctly said by a noted
judge and professor of international law, "[t]here is no doubt that
decisions of municipal courts which involve a breach of international
obligations may be imputed to the State, since they exercise their
jurisdiction in the name of the State." Although there is difficulty in
such cases as the present one of Guanghua Liao in which powers are
divided among three governmental branches, a State "is not entitled
to invoke this independent character to avoid responsibility for a

210.
211.

Id.
Constitution, Japan, arts. 93, 98, 99.
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breach occasioned by a judgment of the court. '' 212 Similarly, according
to Professor Starke, a court cannot plead that its domestic law exonerated it from performing obligations imposed by an international
treaty. 21 A famous Japanese politician is also of the opinion that,
although Japan maintains a "Sanquan fenli" government system, it
has a responsibility to function as one single state in foreign affairs.
Therefoire, the Japanese Government cannot evade, on the ground of
"Sanquanfenli," its international responsibility for the court's rulings
214
in the Guanghua Liao case.
D.

Word Tricks: Recognition v. Understanding

In the present Guanghua Liao case, the Japanese courts were
bent on deliberately juggling with terms, saying that the Japanese
Government in the Joint Communiqu6 merely "understands and respects" the stand of the People's Republic of China that "Taiwan is
an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China,"
that the word "agrees" or "recognizes" is not employed in that sentence, and that, therefore, the Japanese Government "did not undertake legal obligations to deny the existence of the regime in Taiwan"
per se. 215 This is meant to imply that the Japanese Government did
not undertake to only recognize the Government of the People's Republic of China, or that it did not undertake to recognize only one China.
In other words, according to the Japanese courts' allegations, "recognizing" the People's Republic of China as the sole government of China
and "understanding and respecting" the Chinese Government's position
that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory does not
prohibit the Japanese Government from simultaneously recognizing
"another Government of China" or "another China."
The above assertion and its implication are legally unsound and
groundless. While it is suggested that the Japanese Government should
explicitly declare that Taiwan is part of the Chinese territory,216 the
words used in the Joint Communiqu6 are explicit enough: 1) Japan
recognized the People's Republic of China Government as the sole
legitimate government of China; 2) it fully understands and respects

212.

H. MOSLER, supra note 112, at 162.
213. J. STARKE, supra note 1, at 85-86.
214. See Zhong Ri Minjian Renshi Tan GuanghuaLiao Wenti, supra note 49, opinion per
Takatoshi Fujita, former Representative, Japanese Socialist Party.
215. See Zhu, supra note 12.
216. See Zhong Ri Minjian Renshi Tan Guanghua Liao, supra note 50, opinion per Tadashi
Okuwald, Professor of Law of the University of Rikkyo, Japan.
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China's position that Taiwan is an inalienable territorial part of the
People's Republic of China; and 3) it firmly adheres to the Potsdam

Declaration. 217
Paragraph 8 of the Potsdam Declaration again states in principle
that Taiwan and adjacent islands should be returned to China from
Japan's rule.218 A combination of the above three elements can only
result in Japan's recognition of Taiwan as an inalienable part of the
Chinese territory. Reading through the context of the Sino-Japanese
Joint Communique, one would necessarily conclude that the spirit and
substance throughout the Joint Communiqu6 is: To Japan, Taiwan
belongs to China, and the sole legitimate Chinese Government is the
People's Republic of China Government.
The Japanese Government, while recognizing the Government of
the People's Republic of China as the sole lawful Government of China,
would not go so far as to contradict itself to recognize a so-called
"Republic of China." Rather, in a statement to "regret" and to
apologize for certain earlier irresponsible and unfriendly statements
made by a high-ranking official of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the
Japanese Government emphasizes that the national will, or "State
will" of Japan is, to uphold the "one China" policy, and to oppose the
so-called "two Chinas" or "one China and one Taiwan" proposition.219
This policy of the Japanese Government is well acknowledged by
the Japanese judiciary. In Kinichiro Kushimoto v. The Government
of Japan,22 for example, the Hiroshima High Court of Japan admits:
It is a known fact that on September 29, 1972, the Prime
Minister of Japan Kakuei Tanaka, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Masayoshi Ohira and Premier of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China Chou-en-Lai, Minister of Foreign
Affairs Chi Peng-Fei issued the following statement: the
Government of Japan recognizes that the People's Republic
of China is the only legitimate Government of China. The
People's Republic of China emphasizes that Taiwan is an
inseparable part of the territory of the People's Republic of
China. The Government of Japan understands this position
of the People's Republic of China fully, respects it and will

217.

218.

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, reprinted in 2 FORIEGN RELATIONS OF THE

UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS: CONFERENCE OF BERLIN (POTSDAM CONFERENCE

1945) 1474-76 (U.S. Government Printing Office 1960), 8.
219. See People's Daily, June 16, 1987, at 1.
220. Kinichiro Kushimoto v. The Gov't of Japan, Judgment of Sept. 11, 1975, reprinted in
21 J.A.I.L. 159 (1977).
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firmly support it based on paragraph8 of the Potsdam Declaration.21
Elsewhere, the same court made the following additional remarks:
The question of which government of another nation to recognize is a matter of policy decided in accordance with customary practice in international law. The existence of more
than one government is itself an internal problem of the
other nation ....
The abrogation of the Japan-Republic of
China Peace Treaty, and the severance of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Republic of China is an unavoidable consequence of the recognition by Japan of the
People's Republic of China.2
Under international law, a State can have only one central Government, and this Government should be the only organ to represent the
State to exercise its functions in relations to foreign States. This
"soleness" is exclusive and absolute, and there is no room for flexibility.
That there is only one China of which Taiwan is an inalienable territorial part, is the common allegation of the Chinese people residing on
both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and it is the Japanese Government's
"constant and never-changing" official position as well.m Given the
circumstances in which the Japanese Government undertakes international treaty obligations to recognize only one China and only one
legitimate Government thereof, how could the Osaka High Court and
the Kyoto District Court regard a Chinese local regime as a "State"
or a "Government?" How could they accept and decide on a lawsuit
instituted by the local Taiwanese authorities in the name of the so-called "Republic of China" concerning China's State-owned property? It
is of no avail for the Osaka High Court to play word tricks. The efforts
are helpless and only expose that these acts are completely in violation
of the Joint Communiqu6 and other pertinent agreements between
China and Japan, and depart from Japan's officially declared policy
and position in relation to the People's Republic of China.
E.

The Disability of a Local Government

As pointed out, in international law there can be only one central
government in a State. A local Government, unless duly authorized
by the central Government or through special legislation, is by no

221.
222.
223.

Id. at 160-61. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 161.
See People's Daily, June 16, 1987, at 1.
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means entitled to represent the State as a whole, or to speak on behalf
of the central Government which is the sole representative for the
State.- In the Chinese case, the "Republic of China" as a form of
Government ceased to exist with the founding of the People's Republic
of China. Although the authorities in Taiwan claim to be the "Government of the Republic of China," it has been derecognized by the
overwhelming majority of the international community in general, and
by Japan in particular. According to the general rule of non-access by
the non-recognized, therefore, the local Kuomintang regime in Taiwan
surely does not have standing on behalf of the derecognized "Republic
of China" before the courts of Japan, a non-recognizing State. On the
other hand, the Government of the People's Republic of China is
overwhelmingly recognized as the sole legitimate Government of the
country. There cannot be more than one representing and central
Government within a single State. The authorities in Taiwan are apparently, at most, a local regime governing one of China's local provinces.
Then comes the question: can the Taiwan authorities appear in
Japanese courts in the name of a local Government, rather than as a
"national Government," in the Guanghua Liao case? Given the nature
and subject matter of the case, one has to answer this question in the
negative. Even if the Taiwan regime changes (as it did) the designation
of the litigation so as to read "Taiwan" rather than "The Republic of
China," it still lacks the capacity to appear, as a local entity of
China, before the Japanese courts in the GuanghuaLiao case because
the dormitory building is a public and State-owned property.2 6 The
property belongs to the State of China as a whole, not to any part
thereof. The central regime - the Government of the People's Republic of China - is the only entity or organ entitled to represent the
State to claim and protect its ownership to its State property, movable
or immovable, deposited or situated in a foreign country. A local
agency or an individual does not possess the capacity to claim a right
to such ownership without proper authorization by the central Government of the State. As Professor Sekino puts it,

224. See supra note 213 and accompanying text; see also supranotes 73-75 and accompanying
texts.
225. The Plaintiff in the Guanghua Liao case at a later stage did change its designation
from the "Republic of China" to "Taiwan." See Lihai, supra note 35; Zhu, supra note 12.
226. Cf. Varga v. Credit Suisse, 162 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1957), discussed at supra notes 96-98
and accompanying texts.
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[a]s is universally known, the word "Taiwan" is used to indicate a local area of China. It is a geographical name, and
does not possess legal personality (as a state does). If a
party is an entity that does not possess legal personality in
international law, it of course does not have the capacity
(procedural ability of a party) of claiming rights to state
property. Since the Guanghua Liao building is China's state
property, only the Chinese State or its Government possesses the capacity of a party. Therefore,

. .

. a mere geographi-

cal name cannot enjoy ownership rights to state property,
nor can it enjoy the procedural ability and capacity of a party
before [Japanese] courts .

. .

. If the name of Taiwan is

used, the litigation per se cannot be brought.'
In short, as a local entity is not entitled to represent the Chinese
nation as a whole, the Taiwan province maintains no right to the
Guanghua Liao building and the land' beneath. It follows that under
whatever name, either the "Republic of China" or otherwise, the
Taiwan authorities' institution of proceedings against the State's property in Japanese courts is simply illegal. The Japanese courts should
have denied the standing to sue of the derecognized "Republic of
China," and they should have equally denied access to the courts by
the regime in its local capacity.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Given the above discussion and analysis, it is not difficult to see
that the principle that a non-recognized State or Government may not
sue in the courts of the State refusing recognition has long become a
generally accepted customary rule of international law. This principle
is not only upheld and affirmed by many noted international lawyers,
but is also evidenced through numerous internal judicial decisions.
Where the competent executive or legislative branch of the Government of one particular State has explicitly declared its position in
regard to recognition, the judiciary may not make an independent and
initial judgment upon the status of a foreign entity or any part thereof.
Only where the executive or legislative branch has not acted either
favorably or unfavorably upon the foreign entity or a party thereof,
may the judicial branch take the liberty of inquiring into and judging
the specific situations in regard to that foreign entity in question,
provided that in doing so the judicial branch does not conflict with

227.

Sekino, supra note 47.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol5/iss3/5

66

Shen: Revisiting the
Disability of the Non-Recognized
in the Courts of
NON-RECOGNIZING
STATES

the Government's foreign policy and the national interest, and does
not violate international law and the nation's international obligations.
This is exactly where the gist and essence of the customary rule of
non-access by the nonrecognized lies.
This analysis also applies to the distinctions between the status of
an "unrecognized de facto government" and that of a "derecognized
government."228 It is one thing that a newly-born defacto Government
is not accorded recognition by a foreign state - the political department of the latter Government may not have acted either favorably
or unfavorably upon the newly emerged de facto regime and it is quite
another that a former recognized Government has been derecognized
by a Foreign State - the latter Foreign Government has explicitly
declared its position and has thus acted unfavorably toward the old
recognized Government by withdrawing its recognition. A newly-born
de facto Government which is subject to foreign recognition often
enjoys a de facto exception to the general non-access rule, while an
old Government which has been withdrawn recognition is absolutely
subject to the non-access rule.
While there have been certain exceptional or seemingly exceptional
cases, those we have discussed thus far have all occurred on the basis
of non-deviation from the main and essential part of the non-access
principle, and many such cases, directly or indirectly, were actually
in affirmation of the above principle from different angles.
The Japanese Government, through treaty-type instruments as the
Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqu6 and the Peace and Friendship
Treaty, expressly recognizes the Government of the People's Republic
of China as the sole legitimate Government of China of whose territory
Taiwan is an inalienable part, and concededly undertakes to maintain
merely unofficial, non-governmental or local contacts with people in
Taiwan. It severed "diplomatic relations" with the so-called "Republic
of China" and terminated the illegally concluded "Japan-Republic of
China Treaty of Peace" 17 years ago. The Japanese Government
has more than once emphasized the position "that Taiwan should
be returned to China" is its constant and never-changing stance. 2 - All
of the above facts necessarily signify that the Japanese Government
has derecognized, and does not and cannot recognize the self-claimed
"Republic of China."
The Osaka High Court and the Kyoto District Court's acts in permitting the Taiwan authorities to sue on behalf of the legally extinct

228.
229.

See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying texts.
See People's Daily, June 16, 1987, at 1.
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"Republic of China" against China's State immovables situated in
Japan, and in disregarding the Japanese Government's international
obligations and its obvious and expressive non-recognition policy and
attitude toward the so-called "Republic of China," which, as a former
form of Government once representing the State of China, had long
ago stepped down from the international arena of history and had
thus become extinct both de jure and de facto to Japan, not only
played wilfull and wanton tricks on the Joint Communiqu6 and other
pertinent agreements between the People's Republic of China and
Japan, as well as on the jus cogens of pacta sunt servanta, but also
trampled on the generally accepted rule of customary international
law that a non-recognized State or Government may not appear before
the courts of the non-recognizing State.
The action concerning the Guanghua Liao building is by no means
merely an ordinary civilian lawsuit. It involves significant political and
legal issues. The Japanese courts went so far as to treat the Taiwan
authorities as a de facto "Government." This is an obvious and
thoroughgoing act in suggesting the so-called "two Chinas" or "one
China and one Taiwan," an act which is totally in conflict with Japan's
international obligations, and totally contrary to the positions of the
Japanese Government on Sino-Japanese relations, particularly contrary to the Japanese Government's position and obligations with respect to the Taiwan issues. It is a well-known legal and political fact
all over the world that there is only one China, and Taiwan is one of
China's constitutional provinces. No matter what it claims itself to be,
how politically and otherwise different it purports to be from the
central Government in Beijing, and whether it has agreed to submit
to the central Government, the current Kuomintang rdgime in Taiwan
is merely a local governmental organ. Under no circumstance can it
be or become a "State" or a "Government" in the fullest sense. Taiwan
is inseparable from the mainland. The present confrontation and opposition between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait within the Chinese
territory caused by historical, political and military reasons are purely
a matter of China's internal affairs of the State, a matter not to be
interfered with by any foreign powers. Such domestic confrontation
will not be permanent and will not endure long, and the situation has
nothing to do with other States.
The Guanghua Liao building in question, purchased after World
War II with public money belonging to the Chinese people, is China's
State public property used for public purposes. ° China has been rep-

230.

See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying texts.
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resented by the Government of the People's Republic of China since
it replaced the previous Government of the "Republic of China" in
1949. According to the rule regarding governmental succession and
to the rule regarding recognition of Government, the right to any of
China's State properties within and/or outside Chinese territory is of
course passed to the present Government of the People's Republic
from the former nationalist Government. The Osaka High Court's
substantive ruling that the Guanghua Liao building belongs to the
Taiwan authorities is an obvious departure from the above rules. No
matter under what name, the local Taiwan authorities are not entitled
to the Chinese State property located in Japan. The building concerned
and the land therebeneath belong to the Chinese State as a whole,
which is solely, lawfully and effectively represented by the central
Government of the People's Republic of China, and not by the Taiwan
province.
In brief, the Taiwan authorities, not recognized by the Japanese
Government either as a "State" or as a "Government," have no standing to sue in the courts of Japan. The Osaka High Court and the
Kyoto District Court's acceptance of claims brought by the Taiwan
authorities per se is entirely illegal and void. These Courts committed
further violations of international law by rendering judgments holding
that China's State property in question belongs to the so-called "Republic of China." As a result of such violations of treaty provisions
and other rules of international law, there of course arises the issue
of responsibility on the part of the Japanese side. The Japanese Government's failure to help transfer the registration of the immovables
concerned, and the Japanese courts' illegal acceptance and decisions,
are all attributable to the State of Japan.-' The Japanese Cabinet,
which is in charge of Japan's foreign relations, is thus unquestionably
under obligations to make appropriate reparations on this matter to
the Chinese Government and the Chinese people - either by helping
reverse the illegal and erroneous judgments, or by taking other necessary steps toward solving the problem. Any effort to avoid responsibility can only result in serious violations of law and damage to the
legal basis of the Sino-Japanese relations.

231.

See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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